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Objectives	  	  	  The	  objective	  of	  the	  thesis	  is	  to	  study	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  competitive	  balance	  in	  the	  National	  Hockey	  League.	  Unlike	  many	  studies	  related	  to	  the	  topic,	  I	  found	  it	  interesting	  to	  consider	  both	  the	  athletical	  and	  financial	  side	  of	  competitive	  balance.	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  financial	  side,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  revenue	  sharing	  program	  along	  with	  franchise	  valuations.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  objective	  is	  to	  show	  that	  there	  are	  major	  drawbacks	  when	  the	  competitive	  balance	  is	  solely	  related	  to	  the	  financial	  side	  of	  the	  business.	  When	  we	  also	  consider	  the	  athletical	  side	  of	  the	  business,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  get	  a	  more	  comprehensive	  understanding	  of	  the	  formation	  of	  competitive	  balance	  in	  the	  National	  Hockey	  League.	  	  
Findings	  	  Using	  empirical	  data	  from	  the	  NHL	  website	  along	  with	  relevant	  studies,	  I	  was	  able	  to	  create	  comparison	  between	  the	  financial	  competitive	  balance	  and	  the	  athletical	  competitive	  balance.	  The	  league	  utilized	  a	  revenue	  sharing	  program	  to	  address	  the	  financial	  inequalities,	  but	  it	  seems	  rather	  inefficient	  considering	  the	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  franchise	  valuations.	  There	  are	  also	  major	  differences	  in	  the	  market	  size	  and	  fan	  base	  between	  franchises,	  which	  do	  not	  create	  equal	  possibilities	  for	  financial	  success.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  athletical	  success	  of	  each	  franchise	  is	  efficiently	  taken	  into	  consideration.	  
III	  
Systems	  such	  as	  the	  reverse	  order	  draft	  allow	  franchises	  to	  gradually	  strengthen	  their	  competitive	  balance	  regardless	  of	  their	  financial	  situation.	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  The	  National	  Hockey	  League	  is	  a	  professional	  sports	  association	  founded	  in	  the	  early	  20th	  century.	  Starting	  out	  with	  six	  original	  franchises	  until	  1968,	  the	  association	  has	  grown	  to	  a	  thirty-­‐team	  league	  that	  covers	  almost	  the	  entire	  United	  States	  and	  Canada.	  Starting	  with	  the	  original	  six	  teams,	  the	  league	  was	  concentrated	  entirely	  in	  the	  Eastern	  parts	  of	  Canada	  and	  the	  U.S.	  After	  1968	  the	  league	  started	  to	  expand	  to	  new	  areas	  towards	  the	  west,	  and	  the	  expansion	  has	  proven	  to	  be	  more	  or	  less	  a	  gamble	  when	  considering	  the	  profitability	  and	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  added	  franchises.	  In	  the	  modern	  league,	  the	  financial	  differences	  between	  franchises	  are	  mostly	  equalized	  through	  a	  revenue	  sharing	  program	  that	  forces	  financially	  successful	  franchises,	  and	  the	  entire	  league,	  to	  share	  part	  of	  their	  revenue	  with	  other	  teams.	  The	  main	  idea	  behind	  the	  revenue	  sharing	  program	  in	  the	  league	  is	  to	  maintain	  athletical	  and	  financial	  competitive	  balance	  between	  teams,	  and	  consequently	  improve	  the	  entertainment	  value.	  Entertainment	  value	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  universal	  idea,	  basically	  meaning	  that	  each	  single	  game	  should	  be	  more	  or	  less	  based	  on	  unexpected	  outcomes.	  However,	  considering	  the	  nature	  of	  profit	  making	  in	  economics,	  it	  seems	  rather	  inefficient	  when	  economically	  profitable	  franchises	  are	  forced	  to	  hinder	  their	  growth	  via	  revenue	  sharing	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  league’s	  idea	  of	  competitive	  balance.	  Instead	  of	  focusing	  solely	  on	  the	  financial	  side	  of	  competitive	  balance,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  consider	  the	  influence	  that	  the	  financial	  situation	  of	  each	  franchise	  has	  on	  its	  athletical	  competitive	  balance	  compared	  to	  the	  league	  as	  a	  whole.	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1. Competitive	  balance	  
	  Most	  literature	  around	  the	  idea	  of	  competitive	  balance	  relates	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  professional	  sports	  leagues	  should	  create	  as	  financially	  equal	  league	  as	  possible	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  competitiveness	  in	  the	  league.	  This	  is	  a	  unique	  attribute	  of	  professional	  sports	  when	  thinking	  of	  other	  industries	  in	  economical	  terms.	  As	  Simon	  Rottenberg	  (1956)	  long	  ago	  noted	  “the	  nature	  of	  the	  industry	  is	  such	  that	  competitors	  must	  be	  approximately	  equal	  ‘size’	  if	  any	  are	  to	  be	  successful”	  (Sanderson	  p.259).	  This	  notion	  is	  not	  entirely	  true	  in	  today’s	  professional	  sports	  league,	  such	  as	  the	  NHL,	  but	  it	  holds	  the	  main	  idea	  of	  competitive	  balance.	  The	  most	  important	  notion	  of	  competitive	  balance	  on	  professional	  sports	  leagues	  comes	  from	  the	  idea	  of	  entertainment	  value.	  This	  basically	  means	  that	  competition	  between	  franchises	  is	  the	  product	  being	  sold,	  and	  that	  every	  game	  should	  be	  more	  or	  less	  based	  on	  unexpected	  outcomes.	  	  There	  are	  great	  differences	  in	  the	  franchise	  values	  between	  teams	  that	  we	  will	  discuss	  further	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  but	  because	  professional	  sports	  franchises	  are	  in	  a	  business	  of	  selling	  competition,	  this	  inequality	  has	  been	  addressed.	  The	  National	  Hockey	  League	  has	  adopted	  a	  salary	  floor	  and	  salary	  cap	  system	  that	  equalizes	  the	  financial	  differences.	  This	  requires	  all	  franchises	  to	  remain	  within	  certain	  boundaries	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  player	  salary	  spending	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  competitive	  balance	  in	  the	  league	  despite	  the	  great	  differences	  in	  the	  in	  the	  franchise	  values.	  Other	  means	  for	  maintaining	  competitive	  balance	  are	  the	  league	  adopted	  revenue	  sharing	  program	  and	  reverse	  order	  draft,	  both	  which	  will	  be	  specifically	  addressed	  later	  on.	  
	  
4	  
1.1	  Value	  calculations	  
	  As	  noted	  earlier,	  most	  literature	  around	  the	  idea	  of	  competitive	  balance	  in	  sports	  leagues	  focuses	  solely	  on	  the	  financial	  side	  of	  the	  business.	  To	  support	  the	  theoretical	  perspective	  on	  the	  matter,	  I	  researched	  actual	  franchise	  value	  figures	  from	  the	  NHL	  for	  the	  past	  five	  years.	  Using	  these	  numbers	  we	  can	  point	  out	  some	  serious	  flaws	  when	  the	  idea	  of	  competitive	  balance	  is	  being	  solely	  related	  to	  the	  financial	  side	  of	  each	  individual	  franchise	  and	  the	  league	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	  value	  figures	  are	  mandatory	  for	  each	  franchise	  to	  make	  public	  and	  thus	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  make	  comparisons	  on	  how	  the	  values	  have	  changed	  within	  and	  between	  franchises.	  The	  main	  problem	  with	  relating	  competitive	  balance	  to	  financial	  equality	  arises	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  franchises	  in	  the	  NHL	  are	  not	  even	  remotely	  evenly	  valued.	  This	  can	  be	  confirmed	  when	  looking	  at	  the	  franchise	  value	  figures	  in	  table	  1.1.	  According	  to	  the	  table,	  the	  value	  difference	  between	  the	  most	  valuable	  and	  least	  valuable	  franchises	  in	  2011	  is	  approximately	  387	  millions.	  Comparing	  this	  difference	  to	  more	  recent	  valuation	  in	  2015,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  that	  the	  difference	  has	  escalated	  significantly	  even	  with	  the	  revenue	  sharing	  process	  present.	  In	  2015,	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  most	  valuable	  franchise	  (NY	  Rangers)	  and	  least	  valuable	  franchise	  (Florida)	  has	  increased	  to	  1,014	  millions.	  Taking	  these	  values	  into	  consideration,	  it	  is	  almost	  impossible	  to	  see	  how	  the	  financial	  competitive	  balance	  could	  be	  balanced	  in	  the	  league.	  This	  problem	  has	  been	  addressed	  in	  the	  league	  through	  the	  revenue	  sharing	  program	  and	  salary	  cap,	  but	  financial	  competitive	  balance	  seems	  highly	  problematic	  nevertheless.	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The	  mean	  franchise	  value	  in	  2015	  is	  approximately	  504.9	  millions,	  while	  the	  median	  value	  is	  approximately	  417.5	  millions.	  Comparing	  these	  to	  the	  same	  value	  figures	  in	  2011,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  average	  growth	  rate	  of	  an	  NHL	  franchise	  has	  been	  approximately	  100%	  during	  this	  time	  span.	  However,	  if	  we	  point	  out	  some	  abnormalities	  from	  the	  table	  we	  can	  see	  that	  there	  are	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  growth	  rate	  of	  individual	  franchises.	  For	  example,	  the	  four	  franchises	  that	  have	  experienced	  the	  most	  growth	  since	  2011	  (Chicago,	  Washington,	  Los	  Angeles	  and	  Montreal)	  have	  grown	  in	  value	  terms	  over	  150%.	  Now	  comparing	  this	  to	  the	  four	  franchises	  that	  have	  experienced	  the	  least	  growth	  since	  2011	  (Florida,	  Tampa	  Bay,	  Carolina	  and	  Columbus)	  we	  can	  see	  that	  their	  growth	  figures	  stay	  under	  50%	  during	  the	  time	  span.	  	  With	  these	  figures	  in	  mind	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  the	  competitive	  balance	  could	  only	  be	  measured	  in	  financial	  terms.	  After	  all,	  there	  are	  some	  naturally	  occurring	  differences	  between	  franchises	  that	  will	  not	  allow	  equal	  growth.	  These	  are	  for	  example	  location,	  fan	  base,	  athletical	  success	  and	  ownership	  incentives.	  All	  of	  these	  differences	  will	  be	  individually	  evaluated	  later	  in	  the	  paper.	  	  
	  
1.2	  Salary	  cap	  and	  floor	  
	  To	  address	  the	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  franchise	  value	  figures,	  the	  NHL	  has	  adopted	  so	  called	  salary	  cap	  and	  salary	  floor	  system.	  This	  restricts	  all	  teams	  in	  the	  league	  to	  balance	  their	  player	  salary	  spending	  to	  a	  certain	  level.	  This	  is	  alternative	  to	  an	  open	  market	  system	  where	  there	  are	  no	  restrictions	  to	  salary	  spending.	  According	  to	  Zimbalist,	  economical	  theory	  would	  suggest	  that,	  under	  most	  assumptions,	  the	  cap	  system	  is	  more	  likely	  to	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promote	  competitive	  balance	  (p.25).	  Thus	  it	  appears	  to	  be	  preferred	  mechanism	  for	  optimizing	  league	  performance.	  This	  can	  be	  tied	  again	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  entertainment	  value	  in	  the	  league,	  where	  the	  athletical	  equality	  is	  enforced	  even	  though	  significant	  financial	  differences	  do	  appear.	  	   There	  is	  plenty	  of	  theoretical	  evidence	  on	  why	  the	  open	  market	  for	  player	  acquisition,	  and	  more	  specifically,	  player	  salary	  spending	  is	  not	  preferred	  when	  promoting	  the	  idea	  of	  competitive	  balance.	  Rosen	  argues	  in	  his	  study	  as	  follows:	  “It	  was	  claimed	  that	  an	  open	  market	  for	  player	  services	  would	  allow	  “rich”	  teams	  in	  the	  large	  markets	  to	  grab	  all	  the	  talented	  players,	  leaving	  little	  left	  over	  for	  the	  “poor”	  teams	  and	  their	  fans	  in	  smaller	  markets.	  Athletic	  competition	  allegedly	  would	  degenerate	  into	  groups	  of	  “haves”	  and	  “have	  nots.”	  Games	  would	  be	  unfair	  and	  boring,	  and	  fan	  interest	  would	  wane	  unless	  these	  forces	  were	  contained.	  As	  discussed	  above,	  viewing	  this	  claim	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  Coase	  Theorem	  proves	  that	  it	  seriously	  flawed.”	  P.26	  	  The	  open	  market	  for	  players	  would	  almost	  certainly	  lead	  to	  situation	  where	  the	  markets	  for	  hockey	  entertainment	  would	  be	  concentrated	  to	  few	  areas	  and	  few	  franchises.	  These	  franchises	  would	  grow	  exponentially,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  competition	  would	  degenerate	  and	  competitive	  balance	  would	  not	  exist.	  For	  the	  few	  strong	  franchises	  and	  especially	  their	  owners	  this	  would	  be	  profitable,	  but	  the	  aggregate	  value	  of	  the	  entire	  league	  would	  diminish	  into	  fraction	  of	  what	  it	  is	  in	  current	  situation.	  	   To	  put	  this	  into	  perspective,	  the	  formation	  of	  dynasties	  in	  terms	  of	  athletical	  success	  is	  the	  situation	  that	  the	  league	  is	  willing	  to	  avoid	  at	  all	  costs.	  Even	  though	  the	  athletical	  domination	  most	  likely	  leads	  to	  financial	  growth	  for	  the	  individual	  franchise	  in	  a	  short-­‐term	  period,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  consider	  the	  long-­‐term	  consequences.	  As	  was	  established	  earlier,	  the	  league	  would	  suffer	  as	  a	  whole,	  but	  most	  likely	  so	  would	  the	  individual	  franchises	  also.	  According	  to	  a	  case	  study	  by	  Larsen,	  the	  NFL	  franchise	  that	  dominated	  the	  league	  in	  the	  50’s	  and	  60’s	  began	  to	  lose	  attendance	  even	  though	  their	  winning	  record	  was	  
7	  
unmatched	  in	  the	  league	  (p.375).	  This	  is	  another	  great	  example	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  athletical	  competitive	  balance	  in	  sports	  leagues.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  notice	  that	  the	  competitive	  balance	  is	  vital	  for	  the	  league	  as	  a	  whole,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  important	  for	  the	  individual	  franchises	  over	  long-­‐term	  projections.	  	   Building	  on	  this,	  it	  is	  inevitable	  that	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  challenges	  in	  terms	  of	  financial	  competitive	  balance	  comes	  from	  the	  financial	  viability	  for	  teams	  located	  in	  the	  weak-­‐drawing	  markets.	  According	  to	  Fort	  “the	  analysis	  argues	  that	  an	  enforceable	  salary	  cap	  is	  the	  only	  of	  the	  cross-­‐subsidization	  schemes	  that	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  accomplish	  that	  while	  improving	  the	  competitive	  balance	  in	  the	  league”	  (p.1296).	  Thus	  it	  can	  be	  expected	  that	  the	  salary	  cap	  system,	  and	  the	  revenue	  sharing	  program,	  are	  extremely	  important	  considering	  the	  financial	  competitive	  balance	  in	  the	  National	  Hockey	  League.	  The	  weak-­‐drawing	  market	  franchises	  are	  important	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  overall	  market	  for	  hockey	  entertainment,	  but	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  create	  supporting	  systems	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  these	  franchises	  even	  remotely	  competitive	  in	  financial	  terms	  compared	  to	  the	  franchises	  located	  in	  the	  stronger	  markets.	  	   However,	  even	  with	  the	  salary	  cap	  and	  salary	  floor	  present	  in	  the	  current	  format	  of	  the	  NHL,	  the	  competitive	  balance	  in	  financial	  terms	  will	  not	  be	  perfectly	  balanced.	  Considering	  some	  actual	  quantitative	  examples	  to	  support	  the	  balancing	  idea	  of	  salary	  floor	  and	  ceiling,	  we	  can	  look	  at	  how	  the	  NHL	  has	  utilized	  the	  system	  in	  the	  league.	  Comparing	  the	  salary	  spending	  per	  franchise	  in	  2011	  season	  we	  can	  see	  how	  the	  spending	  is	  strongly	  correlated	  with	  the	  value	  figures.	  According	  to	  NHL.com,	  the	  salary	  floor	  that	  all	  franchises	  must	  reach	  was	  48.3	  millions	  in	  2011,	  and	  the	  salary	  cap	  was	  66	  millions	  (accessed	  5/15/13).	  In	  2015	  these	  figures	  have	  been	  modified	  to	  follow	  the	  aggregate	  growth	  of	  the	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league	  by	  setting	  the	  salary	  floor	  to	  52.8	  millions	  and	  the	  salary	  cap	  to	  71.4	  millions.	  	  The	  1,014	  million	  difference	  between	  the	  values	  of	  NY	  Rangers	  and	  Florida	  in	  2015	  is	  a	  great	  example	  of	  how	  small	  part	  the	  salary	  spending	  is	  for	  the	  financially	  strong	  franchises,	  and	  consequently	  how	  significant	  it	  is	  for	  the	  weaker	  franchises.	  
	  
1.3	  Athletical	  success	  
	   As	  mentioned	  earlier,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  think	  of	  competitive	  balance	  as	  only	  being	  related	  to	  financial	  differences	  between	  franchises.	  I	  would	  suggest	  an	  alternative	  way	  of	  addressing	  the	  idea	  of	  competitive	  balance	  to	  see	  which	  franchises	  are	  actually	  competitive	  compared	  to	  others,	  considering	  the	  athletical	  side	  of	  the	  business	  along	  with	  the	  financial	  side.	  I	  would	  refer	  competitive	  balance	  to	  more	  of	  an	  athletical	  idea	  that	  compares	  the	  franchises	  in	  terms	  of	  athletical	  success	  rather	  than	  solely	  on	  financial	  success.	  The	  reasoning	  for	  this	  is	  that	  the	  financial	  figures	  will	  never	  be	  “competitive”	  around	  the	  league	  for	  obvious	  reasons,	  including	  location	  and	  the	  size	  of	  the	  fan	  base.	  When	  looking	  solely	  the	  athletical	  success,	  we	  can	  see	  which	  teams	  actually	  increase	  the	  entertainment	  value	  of	  the	  hockey	  business,	  and	  which	  teams	  could	  be	  relocated	  in	  order	  to	  have	  more	  positive	  influence	  on	  the	  local	  economy	  and	  the	  entire	  league.	  When	  taking	  the	  athletical	  success	  way	  of	  comparing	  the	  competitive	  balance,	  I	  searched	  the	  year-­‐end	  league	  positions	  of	  each	  franchise.	  The	  position	  in	  the	  league	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  win/loss	  ratio	  that	  each	  franchise	  reaches	  when	  the	  regular	  season	  is	  done.	  For	  obvious	  reasons	  the	  team	  with	  most	  wins	  and	  least	  losses	  finishes	  in	  the	  top	  of	  the	  standings	  and	  the	  team	  with	  least	  wins	  and	  most	  losses	  finishes	  is	  in	  the	  bottom	  of	  the	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standings.	  Because	  each	  team	  plays	  against	  all	  the	  other	  teams	  in	  the	  league,	  the	  competitive	  balance	  between	  the	  teams	  is	  fairly	  accurate.	  According	  to	  Rosen	  and	  Sanderson,	  “it	  is	  impossible	  to	  reallocate	  resources	  in	  a	  sports	  league	  to	  increase	  the	  number	  of	  wins:	  each	  time	  one	  team	  wins	  a	  contest,	  the	  opponent	  loses,	  and	  the	  total	  number	  of	  victories	  is	  unchanged	  (Rosen	  p.3).	  The	  only	  way	  to	  increase	  competitive	  balance	  in	  this	  case	  is	  to	  make	  individual	  games	  and	  league	  positions	  more	  unpredictable.	  Comparing	  the	  mean	  values	  in	  terms	  of	  league	  position,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  compare	  how	  the	  competitive	  balance	  has	  changed	  over	  the	  years.	  According	  to	  table	  1.2,	  there	  are	  six	  franchises	  that	  are	  moderately	  or	  significantly	  less	  competitive	  that	  other	  franchises	  in	  the	  league	  in	  long-­‐term	  projections	  (ten	  years).	  In	  this	  case	  I	  decided	  to	  use	  the	  average	  value	  of	  20	  or	  over	  to	  correspond	  poor	  competitive	  performance.	  The	  closer	  the	  mean	  competitive	  balance	  number	  is	  to	  30,	  the	  less	  competitive	  the	  franchise	  is	  athletically.	  The	  limit	  of	  thirty	  comes	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  NHL	  holds	  thirty	  franchises	  in	  the	  league	  at	  the	  moment.	  The	  projected	  time	  frame	  of	  ten	  years	  should	  be	  enough	  time	  for	  any	  individual	  franchise	  to	  show	  improvement	  in	  athletical	  performance,	  taking	  into	  consideration	  the	  reverse	  order	  draft	  and	  revenue	  sharing	  that	  we	  will	  address	  in	  more	  detail	  later	  in	  the	  paper.	  Comparing	  the	  competitive	  balance	  figures	  in	  table	  1.2	  and	  the	  value	  figures	  in	  table	  1.1,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  athletical	  competitive	  balance	  is	  strongly	  correlated	  with	  the	  financial	  success	  of	  all	  the	  franchises	  in	  the	  league.	  This	  basically	  means	  that	  franchises	  with	  good	  competitive	  balance	  are	  very	  likely	  to	  also	  have	  higher	  value	  than	  franchises	  with	  worse	  competitive	  balance.	  This	  correlation	  is	  clear	  when	  we	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  six	  franchises	  that	  have	  demonstrated	  poor	  competitive	  balance,	  in	  athletical	  terms,	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compared	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  league	  in	  the	  time	  span	  of	  ten	  years.	  Of	  the	  six	  poorly	  performing	  teams,	  five	  are	  valued	  clearly	  under	  the	  median	  value	  (417.5	  million)	  of	  the	  entire	  league.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  we	  were	  to	  consider	  the	  six	  franchises	  with	  the	  highest	  athletical	  competitive	  balance	  average,	  only	  Nashville	  is	  clearly	  under	  the	  median	  value	  average	  of	  the	  entire	  league.	  Another	  useful	  athletical	  competitive	  balance	  comparison	  is	  the	  probability	  of	  winning	  the	  ultimate	  price	  (Stanley	  Cup).	  To	  use	  this	  information,	  I	  searched	  the	  list	  of	  Stanley	  Cup	  champions	  for	  the	  past	  thirty	  years	  (table	  1.3).	  The	  time	  frame	  comes	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  a	  perfectly	  competitive	  balance	  situation	  every	  franchise	  in	  the	  NHL	  could	  be	  expected	  to	  win	  the	  championship	  roughly	  every	  thirty	  years.	  The	  results,	  however,	  show	  that	  only	  fifteen	  franchises	  have	  been	  able	  to	  win	  the	  championship	  during	  this	  time	  span.	  Taking	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  winners,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  of	  the	  eleven	  franchises	  only	  two	  (Carolina	  and	  Tampa	  Bay)	  are	  significantly	  under	  the	  median	  valuation	  in	  the	  league.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  of	  these	  fifteen	  franchises	  as	  many	  as	  seven	  show	  better	  than	  average	  growth	  figures	  during	  the	  studied	  time	  frame.	  It	  seems	  that	  it	  is	  not	  absolutely	  necessary	  to	  be	  competitive	  financially	  to	  be	  able	  to	  win	  the	  championship,	  but	  there	  is	  strong	  causality.	  The	  result	  also	  shows	  that	  the	  athletical	  competitive	  balance	  is	  not	  highly	  effective	  in	  the	  league,	  but	  we	  will	  look	  more	  closely	  at	  the	  reasoning	  for	  this	  later	  in	  the	  paper.	  Considering	  the	  points	  made	  above,	  I	  would	  prefer	  addressing	  the	  idea	  of	  competitive	  balance	  from	  the	  athletical	  and	  financial	  perspectives.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  financial	  competitive	  balance	  does	  not	  seem	  relevant	  when	  considered	  alone.	  Both	  perspectives	  are	  extremely	  vital	  when	  considering	  team	  performances	  and	  optimal	  league	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2.	  Revenue	  sharing	  
	  The	  revenue	  sharing	  program	  that	  the	  NHL	  utilizes	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  factors	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  maintain	  equality	  among	  the	  franchises.	  According	  to	  the	  NHL	  website	  “[The	  revenue	  sharing	  program]	  should	  continue	  –	  and	  even	  improve	  –	  the	  historic	  and	  unprecedented	  quality	  of	  play	  and	  competitive	  balance	  achieved”	  (accessed	  10/09/16).	  This	  basically	  means	  that	  the	  top	  revenue-­‐generating	  teams	  are	  required	  to	  allocate	  parts	  of	  these	  revenues	  to	  the	  financially	  struggling	  teams.	  The	  reminder	  of	  the	  revenue	  sharing	  pool	  will	  be	  funded	  from	  League-­‐and	  Playoff	  generated	  revenue	  (Official	  NHL	  website).	  	   Again,	  if	  we	  were	  to	  consider	  the	  revenue	  sharing	  idea	  from	  the	  financial	  side	  only,	  it	  has	  some	  serious	  shortfalls.	  The	  significant	  problem	  with	  relating	  competitive	  balance	  to	  financial	  equality	  arises	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  revenue	  sharing	  neither	  maximizes	  any	  franchise	  revenues,	  nor	  actually	  makes	  the	  competitive	  balance	  significantly	  more	  equal.	  The	  revenue-­‐maximizing	  problem	  is	  quite	  straightforward;	  if	  a	  franchise	  is	  demanded	  to	  share	  part	  of	  its	  revenue	  with	  less	  profitable	  franchises,	  it	  cannot	  efficiently	  maximize	  its	  possible	  revenues.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  shared	  revenue	  only	  allows	  the	  weak-­‐drawing	  franchises	  to	  barely	  stay	  competitive	  in	  athletical	  terms,	  not	  to	  make	  them	  financially	  significantly	  more	  equal.	  Promoting	  franchises	  that	  have	  relatively	  weak	  competitive	  balance,	  the	  league	  should	  be	  able	  to	  increase	  their	  competitive	  balance	  over	  time.	  As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  Economic	  Journal	  in	  2001,	  “In	  leagues	  with	  30	  teams,	  the	  probability	  of	  winning	  the	  ultimate	  prize	  [finishing	  1st]	  with	  equal	  distributions	  of	  talent	  in	  any	  given	  year	  is	  .033;	  thus,	  a	  team	  or	  city	  could	  expect	  to	  garner	  a	  championship	  about	  once	  a	  generation”	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(Sanderson	  p.261).	  Obviously	  there	  are	  numerous	  variables	  that	  come	  into	  account	  when	  trying	  to	  win	  championships,	  such	  as	  coaching,	  player	  chemistry	  and	  even	  pure	  luck.	  In	  an	  imaginary	  league	  where	  the	  distribution	  of	  talent	  is	  equal,	  this	  most	  likely	  also	  results	  in	  a	  close	  to	  perfect	  competitive	  balance.	  While	  this	  scenario	  will	  never	  be	  possible,	  getting	  the	  probability	  as	  close	  to	  equal	  as	  possible	  will	  only	  work	  when	  the	  financial	  side	  is	  also	  more	  balanced.	  Considering	  all	  of	  this,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  how	  important	  competitive	  balance	  is	  for	  the	  entertainment	  value	  of	  the	  entire	  league.	  If	  the	  revenue	  sharing	  would	  efficiently	  improve	  financial	  competitive	  balance,	  all	  franchises	  would	  have	  roughly	  equal	  salary	  spending.	  However,	  according	  to	  the	  NHL,	  in	  2015	  there	  were	  six	  franchises	  that	  were	  operating	  at	  the	  salary	  cap	  and	  six	  franchises	  that	  were	  at	  least	  eight	  million	  dollars	  away	  from	  the	  salary	  cap	  (accessed	  26/9/16).	  This	  basically	  shows	  that	  the	  revenue	  sharing	  only	  enables	  certain	  franchises	  to	  reach	  the	  salary	  floor,	  not	  to	  actually	  be	  financially	  competitive	  with	  other	  franchises.	  What	  was	  perhaps	  not	  anticipated	  by	  the	  NHL	  is	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  revenue	  sharing	  welfare	  system	  would	  create	  a	  new	  model	  for	  success	  of	  low-­‐revenue	  franchises	  (Zimbalist	  p.25).	  This	  is	  particularly	  referred	  to	  the	  financial	  side	  of	  each	  individual	  franchise.	  This	  has	  created	  a	  model	  for	  financial	  success	  even	  with	  poor	  athletical	  performance,	  as	  we	  will	  discuss	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  
	  
2.1	  Individual	  team	  motivation	  
	   According	  to	  most	  literature	  considering	  the	  idea	  of	  competitive	  balance	  and	  revenue	  sharing,	  the	  two	  are	  strongly	  correlated	  with	  each	  other.	  Revenue	  sharing	  has	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been	  introduced	  as	  a	  means	  to	  increase	  competitive	  balance	  in	  the	  league	  (Dietl	  p.284).	  However,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  address	  the	  possible	  shortfalls	  that	  the	  revenue	  sharing	  program	  will	  have	  when	  thinking	  about	  the	  economical	  incentives	  of	  franchise	  owners.	  The	  revenue	  sharing	  program	  is	  a	  significant	  reason	  why	  not	  all	  franchises	  are	  necessary	  pursuing	  maximum	  competitive	  balance.	  According	  to	  National	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	  Research,	  	  “Perhaps	  due	  to	  the	  difficulties	  of	  establishing	  market	  price	  mechanisms	  for	  efficiently	  decentralizing	  the	  allocation	  of	  teams	  to	  each	  other,	  or	  due	  to	  adverse	  selection	  arising	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  lower	  quality	  competitors	  tend	  to	  free-­‐ride	  on	  higher	  quality	  rivals	  unless	  given	  incentives	  not	  to	  do	  so”	  (Rosen	  p.5).	  	  	  Taken	  into	  account	  the	  salary	  caps	  and	  salary	  floors,	  some	  less	  profitable	  franchises	  may	  not	  have	  any	  significant	  motivations	  but	  to	  maintain	  their	  payroll	  over	  the	  payroll	  floors	  to	  be	  eligible	  to	  stay	  in	  the	  league.	  After	  all,	  the	  less	  profitable	  franchises	  are	  not	  required	  to	  share	  any	  of	  their	  revenues,	  and	  on	  the	  top	  of	  that	  they	  do	  get	  help	  from	  other	  franchises	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  minimum	  requirements.	  The	  owners	  of	  these	  franchises	  may	  not	  have	  any	  significant	  motivation	  to	  increase	  their	  teams	  competitive	  balance	  compared	  to	  others	  as	  long	  as	  there	  will	  be	  no	  punishment	  for	  doing	  so.	  Owners	  have	  their	  own	  incentive	  on	  making	  marginal	  profit	  from	  the	  franchise	  regardless	  how	  the	  franchise	  does	  in	  the	  league.	  	  It	  can	  be	  assumed	  that	  the	  hockey	  games	  themselves	  are	  not	  the	  main	  source	  of	  profit	  for	  the	  owners.	  As	  pointed	  out	  by	  Fort	  “Over	  and	  above	  earnings	  from	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  operations	  of	  their	  teams	  is	  the	  main	  source	  of	  income	  for	  owners	  of	  professional	  sports	  teams,	  namely,	  capital	  appreciation	  of	  franchise	  values”	  (p.1292).	  This	  is	  interesting	  considering	  that	  the	  average	  growth	  rate	  of	  an	  NHL	  franchise	  since	  2011	  has	  been	  approximately	  100%	  (table.1.1).	  	  It	  can	  be	  quite	  tempting	  for	  less	  valuable	  franchises	  to	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keep	  investments	  to	  minimum	  while	  free	  riding	  on	  the	  league	  wide	  growth	  and	  revenue	  sharing.	  The	  entire	  revenue	  sharing	  idea	  is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  not	  all	  franchises	  have	  equal	  possibilities	  to	  pursue	  revenues.	  Journal	  of	  Sports	  Economics	  introduces	  a	  specific	  phenomenon	  regarding	  to	  revenue	  sharing,	  “According	  to	  the	  dulling	  effect,	  revenue	  sharing	  reduces	  the	  incentives	  for	  clubs	  to	  invest	  in	  playing	  talent	  because	  each	  club	  has	  to	  share	  some	  of	  the	  resulting	  marginal	  benefits	  of	  its	  talent	  investment	  with	  the	  other	  clubs	  in	  the	  league“	  (Dietl	  p.284).	  The	  dulling	  effect	  idea	  works	  for	  both	  the	  highly	  valuable	  and	  less	  valuable	  franchises.	  This	  is	  because	  highly	  valuable	  franchises	  are	  restricted	  to	  have	  only	  very	  few	  high-­‐end	  talents	  in	  their	  team	  because	  of	  the	  salary	  cap.	  For	  obvious	  reasons,	  players	  with	  high	  point-­‐per-­‐game	  average	  or	  similar	  excellent	  statistics	  are	  more	  expensive	  than	  other	  players.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  less	  valuable	  franchises	  are	  keen	  to	  let	  the	  high-­‐end	  talents	  to	  free	  market	  because	  of	  the	  increasing	  costs	  of	  keeping	  the	  player	  over	  time.	  High-­‐end	  talents	  are	  highly	  priced	  in	  the	  markets,	  and	  less	  valuable	  franchises	  rarely	  have	  the	  possibility	  to	  attract	  them.	  According	  to	  a	  Cornell	  and	  Princeton	  University	  study,	  league	  expansion	  imposes	  a	  negative	  externality	  on	  existing	  fans	  due	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  see	  fewer	  superstars	  per	  season	  (Kahn	  p.115).	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  revenue	  sharing	  program	  improves	  the	  competitive	  balance	  in	  the	  league,	  but	  because	  of	  the	  dulling	  effect	  introduced	  by	  Dietl,	  some	  franchises	  will	  operate	  at	  a	  minimum	  budget	  and	  avoid	  any	  unnecessary	  investments	  all	  together.	  This	  again	  leads	  to	  the	  negative	  externality	  and	  possible	  negative	  consequences	  on	  the	  overall	  fan	  base.	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2.2	  Investment	  incentives	  
	   The	  special	  problem	  for	  sports	  leagues	  such	  as	  the	  NHL	  is	  the	  need	  to	  establish	  a	  degree	  of	  competitive	  balance	  that	  is	  acceptable	  for	  the	  fans.	  After	  all,	  sports	  leagues	  are	  in	  a	  business	  of	  selling	  competition;	  and	  consequently	  entertainment	  (Fort	  p.1266).	  The	  competitive	  balance	  problem	  is	  not	  so	  much	  in	  the	  drastic	  value	  differences	  between	  franchises,	  but	  in	  the	  individual	  franchises’	  interest	  in	  investing	  towards	  remaining	  competitive.	  These	  investments	  are	  not	  only	  in	  playing	  talent	  but	  also	  in	  venues,	  marketing,	  entertainment,	  staff,	  etc.	  Competitive	  balance	  distribution	  itself	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  public	  good,	  where	  the	  league-­‐wide	  fan	  base	  can	  enjoy	  more	  competitive	  and	  entertaining	  league.	  Comparing	  this	  to	  unrestricted	  free-­‐market	  situation	  where	  only	  few	  franchises	  acquire	  all	  high-­‐class	  talent	  and	  compete	  for	  the	  ultimate	  price.	  	  These	  negative	  investment	  incentives	  can	  have	  negative	  influences	  on	  the	  consumer	  welfare	  also.	  As	  Kahn	  argues	  “In	  sports,	  for	  example,	  industry	  wide	  rules	  on	  the	  allocation	  of	  players	  or	  on	  the	  location	  of	  teams	  can	  enhance	  consumer	  welfare	  by	  improving	  the	  quality	  of	  entertainment”	  (p.116).	  When	  these	  rules	  are	  not	  perfectly	  followed,	  the	  allocation	  of	  players	  is	  not	  balanced	  in	  the	  league.	  If	  franchises	  are	  not	  motivated	  to	  investing	  in	  playing	  talent,	  the	  competitive	  balance	  will	  suffer	  and	  consumer	  welfare	  will	  deteriorate	  through	  drawbacks	  in	  the	  quality	  of	  entertainment.	  Going	  back	  to	  the	  free-­‐riding	  problem	  introduced	  earlier,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  compare	  the	  different	  incentives	  that	  individual	  teams	  have	  in	  the	  league.	  If	  all	  franchises	  would	  have	  the	  same	  incentive,	  and	  possibility,	  to	  spend	  maximum	  allowed	  on	  playing	  talent	  we	  would	  most	  likely	  have	  close	  to	  equal	  competitive	  balance.	  However,	  the	  problem	  is	  that	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there	  are	  profit	  incentives	  for	  financially	  weaker	  franchises	  to	  sell	  players	  to	  financially	  stronger	  franchises	  until	  the	  revenue	  maximizing	  (not	  competitive	  balance)	  distribution	  in	  established	  (Fort	  p.1282).	  Franchise	  owners	  are	  in	  the	  entertainment	  and	  sports	  business	  to	  make	  profit,	  and	  if	  the	  financial	  input	  is	  limited,	  there	  are	  alternative	  ways	  (than	  winning)	  to	  remain	  profitable.	  	  	  
2.3	  Risk	  aversion	  
	   Individual	  franchises	  are	  operated	  according	  to	  the	  ownership	  will	  and	  it	  becomes	  a	  question	  of	  incentives	  for	  the	  owner	  to	  pursue	  championship,	  win-­‐percentage	  or	  profitability.	  Often	  these	  branches	  go	  hand	  in	  hand,	  but	  it	  also	  depends	  on	  the	  risk-­‐aversion	  of	  the	  owner	  in	  where	  to	  invest	  the	  most.	  Risk	  averse	  owners	  should	  be	  less	  willing	  to	  invest	  large	  sums	  for	  the	  highly	  uncertain	  short	  run	  payoffs	  associates	  with	  winning	  a	  championship	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  more	  predictable	  payoffs	  from	  having	  a	  high	  win-­‐percentage	  (Fort	  p.1270).	  This	  is	  a	  great	  example	  of	  different	  strategies	  that	  franchise	  owners	  can	  take	  considering	  most	  preferred	  outcomes.	  The	  game	  theoretical	  perspective	  can	  be	  applied	  here	  considering	  that	  only	  one	  franchise	  can	  win	  the	  ultimate	  prize	  at	  the	  end	  of	  each	  year.	  	  Taking	  an	  actual	  example	  of	  the	  likelihood	  of	  winning	  the	  ultimate	  price	  in	  NHL	  competition	  (Stanley	  Cup),	  I	  will	  go	  back	  to	  the	  list	  of	  the	  past	  thirty	  winners	  in	  table	  1.3.	  During	  this	  time	  span,	  total	  of	  fifteen	  franchises	  have	  been	  able	  to	  win	  the	  Stanley	  Cup,	  and	  only	  Detroit,	  Edmonton	  and	  Pittsburgh	  have	  been	  able	  to	  win	  back-­‐to-­‐back	  
18	  
championships1.	  Considering	  the	  time	  frame	  of	  thirty	  years	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  NHL	  is	  utilizing	  salary	  cap	  system,	  revenue	  sharing	  and	  reverse	  order	  draft,	  it	  seems	  that	  there	  still	  are	  factors	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  competitive	  balance.	  After	  all,	  if	  we	  reflect	  this	  result	  to	  what	  the	  distribution	  of	  championships	  would	  be	  in	  a	  perfectly	  competitive	  balance	  situation,	  we	  can	  draw	  conclusion	  that	  we	  are	  not	  near	  that.	  In	  a	  perfectly	  competitive	  balance	  situation,	  a	  typical	  fan	  must	  wait	  on	  average	  30	  years	  for	  her	  franchise	  to	  win	  the	  championship.	  The	  likelihood	  of	  winning	  the	  ultimate	  price	  is	  probably	  a	  great	  factor	  in	  the	  owners’	  decision	  to	  build	  the	  franchise.	  Professional	  sports	  highly	  rely	  on	  the	  entertainment	  value	  and	  the	  existing	  fan	  base	  for	  revenues.	  When	  thinking	  about	  the	  reduced	  investment	  incentives	  caused	  by	  revenue	  sharing	  in	  the	  league,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  the	  link	  to	  customer	  behavior.	  After	  all,	  high-­‐class	  athletes	  are	  in	  a	  big	  role	  when	  making	  the	  franchise	  more	  interesting	  to	  spectators.	  While	  being	  a	  branch	  of	  business	  for	  many	  people,	  hockey	  is	  also	  entertainment	  for	  the	  public.	  Franchises	  that	  minimize	  investments	  to	  playing	  talent	  are	  highly	  unlikely	  to	  have	  any	  high-­‐class	  athletes	  to	  attract	  a	  bigger	  fan	  base.	  The	  importance	  of	  this	  is	  inevitable	  considering	  that	  the	  team	  revenue	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  total	  revenue	  from	  gate	  tickets,	  broadcast	  media,	  stadium	  revenues,	  and	  revenues	  from	  licensing	  and	  media	  (Richardson	  p.397).	  Reducing	  the	  entertainment	  value	  of	  a	  franchise	  can	  be	  directly	  linked	  to	  reductions	  in	  the	  franchises	  revenues.	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  The	  NHL	  was	  in	  lockout	  in	  2005	  for	  contract	  disagreements	  so	  there	  is	  no	  winner	  for	  that	  year	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3.	  Expansion	  
	  Franchise	  value	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  determinants	  on	  the	  possibilities	  for	  a	  franchise	  to	  operate	  a	  team	  that	  holds	  a	  high	  competitive	  balance.	  According	  to	  the	  Journal	  of	  Sports	  Economics,	  the	  franchise’s	  value	  is	  mostly	  determined	  by	  the	  market	  size	  [including	  fan	  base],	  team	  performance	  and	  available	  facilities	  (Alexander	  and	  Kern	  p.62).	  While	  these	  determinants	  are	  all	  extremely	  important	  for	  franchise	  values,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  the	  market	  size	  and	  fan	  base	  have	  the	  biggest	  impact	  in	  franchise	  values.	  These	  determinants	  again	  are	  strongly	  dependent	  on	  the	  physical	  location	  of	  any	  given	  franchise.	  	  	   Here	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  consider	  the	  continuing	  expansion	  of	  the	  NHL	  to	  less	  traditional	  hockey	  areas	  such	  as	  California,	  Arizona	  and	  Florida.	  We	  will	  focus	  on	  the	  various	  markets	  in	  where	  hockey	  franchises	  operate	  through	  game	  attendances,	  venues	  and	  local	  economies.	  All	  of	  these	  are	  important	  factors	  when	  considering	  the	  possibility	  and	  likelihood	  for	  a	  newly	  established	  franchise	  to	  operate	  a	  team	  that	  holds	  a	  decent	  athletical	  competitive	  balance	  along	  with	  financial	  stability.	  As	  we	  will	  later	  notice,	  it	  becomes	  more	  or	  less	  of	  a	  gamble	  considering	  the	  probabilities	  of	  a	  new	  franchise	  to	  become	  profitable	  and	  competitive	  compared	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  league.	  	  
3.1	  Market	  size	  and	  fan	  base	  
	  Any	  given	  franchise	  operates	  significant	  numbers	  of	  side	  businesses	  along	  with	  the	  games	  themselves.	  This	  is	  why	  it	  is	  extremely	  important	  to	  gradually	  strengthen	  the	  franchise’s	  public	  image	  in	  order	  to	  consequently	  attract	  a	  bigger	  market.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  realize	  the	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significant	  differences	  in	  franchise	  values	  in	  table	  1.1,	  and	  there	  can	  be	  many	  explanations	  why	  this	  is.	  One	  is	  provided	  in	  the	  NBER	  as	  follows,	  “Economies	  of	  scale	  account	  for	  why	  business	  tends	  to	  be	  so	  concentrated	  [in	  the	  NHL].	  The	  cost	  of	  production	  (a	  performance,	  or	  the	  basic	  invention)	  is	  largely	  independent	  of	  the	  size	  of	  the	  audience;	  most	  of	  the	  costs	  are	  up-­‐front,	  so	  average	  cost	  is	  decreasing	  in	  consumed	  output”	  (Rosen	  p.6).	  Because	  the	  size	  of	  the	  venues	  in	  where	  the	  NHL	  franchises	  operate	  is	  roughly	  equal	  around	  the	  league,	  the	  differences	  in	  revenue	  figures	  do	  not	  arise	  from	  these	  differences.	  	  However,	  each	  franchise	  is	  allowed	  to	  price	  individual	  tickets	  as	  they	  please	  and	  there	  are	  significant	  differences	  in	  spectator	  attendance.	  This	  leads	  to	  a	  situation	  where	  it	  becomes	  a	  question	  of	  the	  competitive	  balance	  and	  consequently	  the	  entertainment	  value	  of	  a	  certain	  franchise.	  Whether	  or	  not	  the	  franchise	  has	  a	  large	  overall	  fan	  base	  is	  a	  great	  measure	  of	  how	  valuable	  the	  franchise	  will	  be.	  After	  all,	  sports	  games	  as	  an	  entertainment	  are	  rather	  excluded	  because	  of	  the	  values	  of	  each	  game	  ticket.	  Individual	  game	  tickets	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  luxury	  good	  because	  of	  their	  excludability.	  The	  larger	  the	  franchises	  fan	  base,	  the	  more	  it	  has	  pricing	  power	  over	  the	  individual	  game	  tickets	  that	  are	  available	  to	  the	  audience.	  This	  idea	  is	  extremely	  important	  when	  considering	  the	  difference	  between	  market	  size	  and	  fan	  base.	  Referring	  to	  Sanderson,	  population	  disparities	  between	  areas	  can	  create	  differences	  in	  aggregate	  willingness	  and	  ability	  to	  pay	  even	  when	  individual	  customers	  in	  the	  various	  host	  cities	  have	  identical	  tastes	  (p.262).	  Considering	  this,	  it	  becomes	  important	  to	  think	  about	  the	  population	  size,	  ability	  to	  pay	  and	  willingness	  to	  pay	  for	  athletical	  entertainment	  (hockey	  especially).	  Strong	  fan	  base	  most	  likely	  means	  high	  willingness	  to	  pay	  for	  hockey	  entertainment,	  regardless	  of	  the	  population	  size.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	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investments	  in	  stadiums,	  playing	  talent,	  etc.	  become	  less	  and	  less	  risky	  for	  the	  franchise	  owners.	  Thus	  it	  becomes	  a	  question	  of	  finding	  the	  strongly	  profitable	  markets	  and	  expanding	  as	  long	  as	  the	  optimal	  league	  size	  has	  been	  reached.	  It	  is	  challenging	  to	  estimate	  what	  could	  be	  the	  optimal	  league	  size	  in	  the	  NHL,	  mostly	  because	  of	  the	  point	  of	  view	  can	  create	  significantly	  different	  results.	  For	  example,	  if	  we	  only	  paid	  attention	  to	  the	  athletical	  competitive	  balance,	  the	  optimal	  league	  size	  would	  most	  likely	  be	  much	  smaller	  than	  if	  we	  only	  paid	  attention	  to	  the	  financial	  competitive	  balance.	  Kahn	  discusses	  on	  this	  topic	  as	  follows:	  “the	  optimal	  league	  size	  is	  smaller	  than	  the	  competitive	  league	  size	  because	  of	  the	  loss	  of	  consumers’	  surplus	  as	  the	  sport	  expands.	  In	  the	  local	  revenue	  model,	  the	  optimal	  league	  size	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  monopoly	  league	  size.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  because	  the	  league’s	  maximization	  of	  total	  profit	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  willingness	  to	  pay	  by	  fans	  of	  inframarginal	  teams	  in	  making	  its	  expansion	  decisions,	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  charge	  different	  prices	  in	  different	  locations	  allows	  the	  league	  to	  capture	  consumer	  surplus”	  (p.116)	  	  Taking	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  this,	  we	  can	  draw	  conclusions	  that	  the	  NHL	  has	  motivation	  to	  expand	  continuously	  since	  the	  aggregate	  revenue	  keeps	  growing	  as	  the	  league	  expands	  into	  new	  areas.	  Then	  it	  is	  owners	  and	  investors	  decision	  to	  decide	  whether	  or	  not	  they	  see	  a	  profitable	  business	  model	  in	  creating	  new	  franchises.	  The	  revenue	  sharing	  program	  is	  probably	  the	  most	  important	  factor	  that	  makes	  league	  expansion	  possible	  even	  to	  “unproven”	  markets.	  	   To	  test	  this	  theory,	  we	  can	  evaluate	  what	  would	  happen	  if	  there	  would	  not	  be	  a	  revenue	  sharing	  program	  in	  the	  NHL.	  Assuming	  free	  entry	  to	  the	  market,	  the	  league	  size	  would	  most	  likely	  reach	  social	  optimum,	  as	  teams	  will	  enter	  as	  long	  as	  the	  marginal	  team	  has	  a	  positive	  value.	  In	  theory,	  this	  situation	  would	  lead	  to	  higher	  number	  of	  teams	  but	  also	  higher	  concentration	  of	  franchises	  to	  large	  “proven”	  markets.	  Most	  likely	  the	  overall	  fan	  base	  would	  diminish,	  as	  market	  would	  concentrate	  to	  a	  few	  areas	  with	  multiple	  franchises	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in	  same	  market	  areas.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  even	  with	  revenue	  sharing	  with	  an	  appropriate	  entry	  fee,	  the	  league	  can	  attain	  the	  socially	  optimal	  size	  (Kahn	  p.117).	  To	  draw	  conclusion	  on	  this,	  it	  becomes	  evident	  that	  the	  National	  Hockey	  League	  does	  not	  pursue	  the	  socially	  optimal	  league	  size,	  but	  rather	  the	  revenue	  maximizing	  league	  size.	  Going	  back	  to	  table	  1.2,	  when	  comparing	  the	  franchise	  values	  and	  their	  changes	  for	  the	  last	  five	  years,	  we	  can	  clearly	  see	  the	  correlation	  between	  competitive	  balance	  and	  franchise	  value.	  Strong	  correlation	  is	  basically	  available	  whenever	  a	  franchise	  either	  has	  low	  competitive	  balance	  and	  low	  growth,	  or	  high	  competitive	  balance	  and	  high	  growth.	  Looking	  the	  league	  as	  a	  whole	  from	  2011	  to	  2015,	  the	  mean	  growth	  rate	  of	  all	  the	  franchises	  combined	  was	  roughly	  100%.	  The	  mean	  growth	  rate	  can	  be	  assumed	  to	  be	  quite	  useful	  considering	  that	  the	  median	  growth	  rate	  is	  also	  very	  near	  the	  100%	  (104.5%).	  Keeping	  these	  figures	  in	  mind,	  we	  can	  easily	  point	  out	  the	  franchises	  that	  have	  abnormal	  growth	  values.	  	  Taking	  into	  consideration	  the	  points	  made	  above,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  think	  what	  motivates	  the	  NHL	  to	  keep	  non-­‐competitive	  franchises	  in	  the	  league.	  One	  clear	  explanation	  could	  be	  national	  TV-­‐casting	  rights.	  When	  the	  league	  agrees	  on	  the	  rights	  to	  cast	  their	  games	  on	  the	  national	  TV,	  it	  is	  motivating	  to	  have	  coverage	  on	  the	  entire	  continent	  to	  reach	  as	  large	  audience	  as	  possible.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  market	  size	  for	  the	  NHL	  is	  the	  entire	  continent.	  Considering	  this	  from	  the	  perspective	  on	  the	  individual	  franchises,	  the	  motivation	  becomes	  also	  quite	  evident.	  As	  Fort	  mentions	  “franchise	  values	  exhibit	  plateaus	  of	  growth	  when	  league	  wide	  expansion	  in	  the	  number	  of	  teams	  is	  occurring,	  as	  simple	  economic	  intuition	  would	  predict”	  (p.1292).	  The	  revenue	  sharing	  program	  motivates	  the	  league	  to	  expand	  to	  new	  areas	  on	  a	  regular	  basis.	  The	  only	  question	  that	  rises	  from	  this	  is	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whether	  there	  is	  some	  sort	  of	  natural	  upper	  limit	  to	  the	  number	  of	  teams	  that	  the	  league	  can	  maintain	  profitably,	  and	  more	  importantly,	  without	  deteriorating	  the	  entertainment	  value	  and	  competitive	  balance	  in	  the	  league.	  	  
3.1.1	  Attendance	  
	  One	  extremely	  important	  factor	  considering	  the	  profitability	  and	  competitiveness	  of	  any	  given	  franchise	  is	  the	  attendance	  that	  the	  franchise	  has	  in	  its	  games.	  In	  a	  location	  study	  by	  Alexander,	  it	  is	  noted	  that	  recently	  established	  franchises	  are	  not	  higher	  valued	  (and	  usually	  lower)	  than	  established	  franchises.	  Explanations	  for	  this	  were	  that	  the	  new	  franchises	  have	  not	  had	  time	  to	  establish	  a	  strong	  fan	  base,	  and	  previous	  growth	  have	  already	  taken	  the	  best	  locations	  in	  terms	  of	  market	  for	  hockey	  entertainment	  (p.59).	  It	  also	  seems	  that	  the	  expansion	  of	  the	  league	  has	  generally	  been	  towards	  the	  more	  marginal	  market	  areas	  in	  terms	  of	  population,	  income	  and	  fan	  interest.	  Besides	  the	  value	  comparison,	  it	  might	  be	  useful	  to	  look	  into	  the	  attendance	  figures	  and	  venue	  capacity	  usage	  of	  individual	  franchises.	  	   To	  get	  perspective	  on	  this	  matter,	  I	  searched	  the	  attendance	  and	  capacity	  figures	  from	  the	  2013	  season	  that	  show	  the	  average	  attendance	  and	  capacity	  usage	  percentages	  per	  game	  for	  each	  franchise	  (table	  1.4).	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  interesting	  figures	  come	  from	  the	  highest	  and	  lowest	  figures.	  The	  franchise	  with	  the	  highest	  attendance	  per	  game	  (Chicago)	  had,	  on	  average,	  21,640	  people	  attending	  each	  home	  game.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  franchise	  with	  the	  lowest	  attendance	  per	  game	  (Arizona)	  had,	  on	  average,	  13,776	  people	  attending	  each	  home	  game	  during	  the	  2013	  season.	  If	  we	  were	  to	  only	  look	  at	  the	  difference	  here,	  
24	  
there	  was,	  on	  average,	  a	  difference	  of	  7,864	  people	  attending	  each	  game.	  Assuming	  that	  there	  are	  also	  significant	  differences	  in	  ticket	  prices	  for	  these	  franchises	  games,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  how	  great	  of	  a	  difference	  the	  attendance	  figures	  make	  on	  the	  valuation	  of	  the	  franchises.	  	   The	  other	  interesting	  figure	  we	  can	  look	  here	  is	  the	  capacity	  usage	  percentage	  for	  each	  franchise	  during	  the	  2013	  season.	  According	  to	  the	  franchise	  information	  for	  attendance	  in	  table	  1.4,	  there	  were	  21	  franchises	  that	  had	  100%	  usage	  capacity	  or	  very	  near	  that.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  the	  nine	  franchises	  that	  barely	  reached	  90%	  usage	  capacity	  also	  struggled	  in	  the	  athletical	  and	  financial	  competitive	  balance	  calculations	  compared	  to	  the	  league	  as	  a	  whole.	  None	  of	  the	  nine	  franchises	  were	  able	  to	  remain	  competitive	  both	  financially	  and	  athletically,	  and	  as	  many	  as	  five	  of	  them	  were	  not	  competitive	  in	  either	  category	  (Arizona,	  NY	  Islanders,	  Florida,	  Columbus	  and	  Carolina).	  From	  these	  figures	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  point	  out	  how	  important	  factors	  the	  market	  size	  and	  fan	  base	  are	  for	  individual	  franchises’	  aim	  to	  remain	  competitive	  with	  other	  franchises.	  	   Comparing	  the	  franchises	  that	  are	  located	  in	  Canada	  and	  those	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  we	  can	  see	  a	  clear	  difference.	  The	  franchises	  that	  are	  located	  in	  the	  U.S.	  had,	  on	  average,	  a	  usage	  capacity	  of	  94.2%	  compared	  to	  the	  Canadian	  franchises	  that	  had	  on	  average	  of	  99.7%.	  The	  average	  attendance	  figures	  followed	  the	  pattern	  with	  an	  average	  of	  17,214	  in	  the	  U.S.	  franchises	  and	  18,412	  in	  the	  Canadian	  franchises.	  There	  should	  to	  be	  a	  clear	  incentive	  to	  create	  or	  relocate	  franchises	  to	  Canada	  if	  we	  only	  compare	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  markets	  from	  hockey	  franchises	  perspectives.	  The	  attendance	  and	  reliability	  to	  market	  attraction	  seems	  to	  be	  inevitable	  when	  we	  concentrate	  on	  the	  franchises	  that	  are	  located	  outside	  of	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the	  U.S.	  markets.	  The	  similar	  pattern	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  valuation	  figures	  that	  we	  will	  concentrate	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  
	  
3.2	  Location	  
	  One	  major	  phenomenon	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  all	  of	  the	  franchises	  that	  are	  located	  in	  Canada	  (Montreal,	  Toronto,	  Winnipeg,	  Ottawa,	  Edmonton,	  Vancouver,	  Calgary)	  are	  doing	  relatively	  well	  when	  looking	  at	  the	  value	  growth.	  All	  of	  the	  Canadian	  franchises	  exhibit	  near	  or	  over	  the	  100%	  value	  growth	  since	  2011,	  and	  the	  mean	  growth	  value	  is	  120%.	  Also	  if	  we	  were	  to	  compare	  the	  overall	  values	  of	  these	  Canadian	  franchises	  compared	  to	  the	  league	  as	  a	  whole,	  we	  can	  find	  similar	  results.	  According	  to	  table	  1.1,	  the	  mean	  value	  of	  all	  the	  franchises	  in	  2015	  is	  about	  505	  millions,	  and	  the	  median	  value	  comes	  down	  to	  about	  418	  millions.	  Considering	  the	  strong	  skewness	  of	  the	  mean	  values	  resulting	  from	  greatly	  unbalanced	  growth	  figures,	  it	  can	  be	  more	  useful	  to	  use	  the	  results	  from	  the	  median	  values.	  Of	  the	  seven	  franchises	  located	  in	  Canada,	  five	  of	  then	  exhibit	  value	  figures	  higher,	  or	  similar	  to	  the	  median	  of	  the	  league.	  Of	  the	  two	  Canadian	  franchises	  that	  exhibit	  somewhat	  lower	  value	  (Winnipeg	  and	  Calgary),	  Winnipeg,	  can	  be	  explained	  by	  the	  very	  recent	  location	  change	  from	  Atlanta	  in	  2011.	  Comparing	  these	  figures	  to	  the	  corresponding	  figures	  of	  the	  franchises	  located	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  we	  can	  see	  some	  significant	  differences.	  Of	  the	  23	  franchises	  located	  in	  the	  U.S.	  over	  half	  of	  them	  (13)	  exhibit	  value	  figures	  that	  are	  lower	  than	  the	  median	  value	  in	  the	  league.	  Even	  more	  interestingly,	  as	  many	  as	  seven	  of	  these	  franchises	  exhibit	  significantly	  lower	  (more	  than	  100	  millions	  lower)	  franchise	  values	  than	  the	  league	  median.	  When	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comparing	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  Canadian	  franchises,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  even	  the	  worst	  Canadian	  franchise	  (Winnipeg)	  would	  have	  higher	  value	  figures	  than	  eleven	  franchises	  located	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  athletical	  competitive	  balance	  also	  correlates	  the	  league	  wide	  findings	  for	  the	  most	  part.	  Using	  a	  competitive	  balance	  number	  of	  15.5	  (mean	  value)	  we	  can	  see	  some	  strong	  correlations	  between	  franchise	  values	  and	  competitive	  balance	  figures.	  Of	  the	  fifteen	  franchises	  that	  exhibit	  lower	  than	  median	  value	  figures,	  as	  many	  as	  ten	  of	  them	  also	  scored	  over	  15.5	  in	  the	  competitive	  balance	  calculations.	  This	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  there	  being	  a	  strong	  correlation	  between	  franchise’s	  competitive	  balance	  in	  the	  league	  and	  its	  overall	  value	  in	  the	  market.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  hypothesis	  of	  franchise	  location	  presented	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  study	  does	  not	  correspond	  the	  findings.	  This	  is	  because	  after	  the	  league	  expansion	  in	  1968,	  there	  are	  relatively	  mixed	  results	  in	  the	  franchise	  values.	  For	  example	  the	  Californian	  franchises	  are	  fairly	  strong	  in	  both	  franchise	  value	  and	  competitive	  balance	  comparison,	  but	  franchises	  like	  Arizona	  and	  Columbus	  have	  struggled.	  This	  most	  likely	  indicates	  that	  it	  really	  is	  more	  or	  less	  of	  a	  gamble	  when	  deciding	  to	  add	  or	  relocate	  a	  franchise	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  It	  also	  becomes	  evident	  that	  recently	  added	  franchises	  need	  significant	  time	  to	  build	  a	  competitive	  program.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  the	  most	  recently	  added	  franchises	  and	  their	  figures.	  Since	  1992	  the	  league	  has	  added	  eight	  new	  franchises	  (Florida,	  Tampa	  Bay,	  Arizona,	  Anaheim,	  Columbus,	  Ottawa,	  Minnesota	  and	  Winnipeg).	  Of	  these	  franchises,	  three	  exhibit	  lower	  than	  average	  growth,	  and	  struggles	  in	  the	  competitive	  balance	  comparison.	  On	  top	  of	  this,	  only	  one	  of	  these	  franchises	  is	  among	  the	  most	  competitive	  athletically	  or	  financially	  in	  the	  league	  (Anaheim	  atletical	  average	  9.8).	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In	  the	  case	  of	  expansion	  in	  the	  NHL,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  think	  what	  would	  be	  considered	  appropriate	  time	  frame	  for	  a	  new	  franchise	  to	  show	  that	  it	  can	  be	  competitive	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  league.	  This	  question	  needs	  to	  be	  addressed	  relative	  to	  the	  location	  of	  the	  added	  franchise.	  In	  a	  case	  study	  by	  Alexander,	  there	  was	  no	  significant	  difference	  between	  recently	  added	  franchises	  and	  established	  franchises	  in	  terms	  of	  average	  values	  (p.59).	  Even	  though	  the	  study	  takes	  into	  consideration	  all	  major	  sports	  leagues	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  it	  can	  be	  considered	  useful	  in	  terms	  of	  expansion	  consequences.	  This	  same	  result	  can	  be	  extracted	  from	  tables	  1.1	  and	  1.2.	  If	  we	  only	  consider	  franchises	  that	  have	  joined	  the	  league	  later	  than	  1992	  (eight	  franchises),	  we	  can	  see	  that	  it	  really	  is	  more	  or	  less	  of	  a	  gamble	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  growth	  and	  competitive	  balance	  of	  the	  added	  franchises.	  Of	  the	  eight	  franchises,	  five	  has	  showed	  positive	  athletical	  competitive	  balance	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  league	  average.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  only	  two	  franchises	  have	  showed	  positive	  financial	  competitive	  balance	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  league	  average.	  
	  
3.3	  Local	  economies	  
	  Thinking	  about	  the	  business	  that	  runs	  along	  with	  individual	  hockey	  franchise,	  there	  are	  numerous	  different	  internal	  or	  external	  ways	  of	  joining	  the	  business.	  However,	  while	  franchises	  that	  are	  valued	  in	  the	  top	  half	  of	  the	  league	  have	  little	  problems	  in	  supporting	  the	  surrounding	  business,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  for	  the	  entire	  league.	  When	  again	  comparing	  the	  franchise	  values	  in	  table	  1.1,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  which	  franchises	  and	  which	  locations	  are	  more	  attractive	  for	  surrounding	  business.	  If	  we	  were	  to	  compare	  franchises	  such	  as	  Toronto	  and	  Florida,	  the	  1,014	  millions	  difference	  in	  franchise	  value	  clearly	  does	  not	  come	  from	  team	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performance	  in	  the	  league.	  The	  reason	  is	  that	  both	  of	  these	  franchises	  exhibit	  low	  competitive	  balance	  (24.4	  and	  21.1),	  but	  Toronto	  still	  holds	  the	  second	  highest	  franchise	  value	  in	  the	  entire	  league	  in	  2015.	  Depending	  on	  the	  value	  of	  the	  franchise,	  there	  are	  very	  different	  ways	  of	  having	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  local	  economies.	  The	  relationship	  between	  the	  franchises’	  costs	  and	  revenues	  is	  naturally	  one	  of	  the	  main	  factors	  when	  determining	  whether	  the	  franchise	  has	  a	  positive	  or	  negative	  impact	  on	  local	  economies.	  According	  to	  the	  Journal	  of	  Sports	  Economics,	  	  	  “NHL	  [franchises]	  all	  have	  certain	  basic	  costs,	  such	  as	  front	  office,	  facility	  rental	  and/or	  maintenance,	  team	  travel,	  promotion,	  ticketing,	  and	  so	  on,	  the	  share	  of	  [total	  revenues]	  represented	  by	  these	  costs	  shrinks	  as	  revenues	  rise.	  Other	  things	  equal,	  this	  leaves	  more	  room	  for	  profit,	  at	  any	  given	  player	  compensation	  share,	  in	  those	  leagues	  with	  higher	  revenues”	  (Zimbalist	  p.22).	  	  	  The	  basic	  costs	  between	  franchises	  are	  roughly	  equal,	  but	  depending	  on	  the	  surrounding	  market	  size	  the	  differences	  between	  franchise	  values	  can	  grow	  exponentially.	  	  The	  two	  franchises	  mentioned	  earlier,	  Saint	  Louis	  and	  Phoenix,	  both	  have	  arenas	  that	  are	  mostly	  financed	  by	  public	  money.	  Saint	  Louis	  arena	  was	  constructed	  using	  34.5	  millions	  of	  Saint	  Louis	  city	  contributed	  money.	  Phoenix,	  however,	  used	  the	  city	  of	  Glendale’s	  funding	  for	  $180	  millions	  for	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  arena.	  The	  $180	  million	  consisted	  of	  $30	  million	  in	  general	  obligation	  bond	  funding,	  and	  $150	  million	  in	  excise	  tax	  funding	  [from	  the	  public]	  (ballparks.com	  accessed	  5/11/13).	  Using	  significant	  amounts	  of	  public	  money	  just	  to	  get	  an	  arena	  to	  compete	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  lack	  of	  confidence	  from	  outside	  investors.	  Even	  though	  the	  arena	  most	  likely	  is	  not	  only	  for	  the	  use	  of	  the	  NHL	  franchise,	  it	  still	  puts	  some	  limits	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  franchise.	  	  Since	  individuals	  are	  generally	  against	  any	  sort	  of	  tax	  increases,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  financing	  a	  sports	  arena	  could	  create	  any	  significant	  increases	  in	  public	  interest.	  After	  all,	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even	  if	  the	  facilities	  are	  financed	  using	  tax	  money,	  it	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  any	  of	  the	  obtained	  revenue	  would	  come	  back	  to	  the	  public	  use.	  The	  public	  can	  only	  observe	  the	  possible	  increased	  entertainment	  value	  that	  a	  newly	  constructed	  arena	  can	  provide.	  For	  the	  league,	  however,	  the	  construction	  and	  renovation	  of	  arenas	  is	  only	  positive.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  likelihood	  that	  the	  public	  will	  notice	  the	  increased	  entertainment	  value	  of	  the	  league	  will	  escalate.	  In	  case	  that	  the	  franchise’s	  arena	  is	  privately	  financed,	  it	  is	  mostly	  up	  to	  the	  investors	  to	  cover	  any	  financial	  problems	  that	  the	  arena	  creates	  while	  used	  by	  the	  hockey	  franchise.	  Naturally	  the	  arenas	  also	  have	  other	  commercial	  use,	  but	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  impact	  that	  the	  hockey	  franchise	  has	  is	  partly	  covered	  by	  the	  investors.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  the	  franchise’s	  arena	  is	  financed	  with	  public	  money,	  it	  also	  means	  that	  the	  possible	  financial	  problems	  of	  the	  franchise	  keep	  having	  negative	  impact	  on	  the	  local	  economy.	  According	  to	  a	  study	  published	  in	  the	  Journal	  of	  Sports	  Economics,	  “the	  negative	  impact	  of	  NHL	  franchise	  is	  statistically	  significant	  in	  both	  short	  and	  long	  run.	  The	  overall	  results	  support	  the	  findings	  of	  prior	  research	  that	  professional	  sports	  franchises	  do	  not	  have	  a	  positive	  economic	  impact	  on	  local	  economies”	  (Lertwachara	  and	  Cochran	  p248).	  The	  study	  mainly	  concentrated	  on	  comparing	  the	  short-­‐	  and	  long-­‐term	  impacts	  on	  annual	  income	  (after	  tax)	  on	  people	  in	  the	  metropolitan	  area	  around	  the	  franchise.	  Even	  though	  the	  study	  can	  be	  slightly	  overstated	  because	  of	  the	  relatively	  small	  sample	  income	  directly	  around	  the	  franchise’s	  location,	  it	  still	  shows	  how	  vulnerable	  the	  surrounding	  economy	  can	  be	  to	  some	  publicly	  financed	  franchise	  investments.	  	  
3.3.1	  Venues	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   One	  of	  the	  biggest	  expenses	  for	  any	  NHL	  franchise	  is	  the	  cost	  of	  building,	  reconstructing	  or	  renting	  a	  facility	  to	  play	  official	  league	  games.	  It	  has	  a	  lot	  to	  do	  with	  the	  financial	  situation	  of	  the	  franchise	  when	  deciding	  what	  kind	  of	  arena	  it	  can	  use.	  According	  to	  ballparks.com,	  all	  arenas	  are	  either	  publicly	  or	  privately	  financed,	  or	  co-­‐financed	  between	  public	  and	  private	  money	  (accessed	  5/11/13).	  Looking	  at	  the	  three	  most	  valuable	  franchises	  in	  the	  National	  Hockey	  League	  (NY	  Rangers,	  Toronto	  and	  Montreal),	  all	  their	  arenas	  are	  financed	  by	  private	  investment	  money.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  looking	  at	  the	  three	  least	  valuable	  franchises	  (Phoenix,	  Columbus	  and	  Saint	  Louis)	  we	  can	  see	  that	  only	  Columbus’	  Nationwide	  arena	  is	  privately	  financed	  by	  Nationwide	  investments.	  From	  this	  we	  can	  draw	  conclusions	  that	  whether	  or	  not	  a	  franchise	  is	  doing	  well	  financially	  has	  a	  lot	  to	  do	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  a	  burden	  or	  goldmine	  for	  local	  the	  economy.	  	  Taking	  a	  larger	  field	  study	  into	  consideration,	  Aleksander	  studied	  the	  U.S.	  big	  four	  sports	  leagues	  (NHL,	  NBA,	  NFL	  and	  MLB)	  during	  1994-­‐2004	  and	  how	  the	  venue	  construction	  had	  been	  financed.	  Of	  the	  total	  of	  62	  new	  stadiums	  constructed	  during	  that	  time	  frame,	  only	  21	  were	  even	  partially	  funded	  by	  state	  governments	  (p.56).	  This	  study	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  how	  the	  local	  economies	  influence	  the	  NHL	  franchises	  and	  vice	  versa.	  Even	  though	  the	  NHL	  is	  highly	  active	  in	  expanding	  the	  league	  into	  new	  economical	  areas,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  consider	  the	  franchise	  owners’	  risks	  and	  consequently	  the	  motivations	  that	  are	  correlated	  to	  this	  risk.	  Considering	  the	  stadium	  funding	  for	  example,	  it	  is	  easier	  to	  understand	  why	  certain	  franchise	  owners	  are	  highly	  risk	  averse	  when	  investing	  into	  player	  talent	  and	  athletical	  competitive	  balance.	  Because	  of	  the	  up	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front	  costs	  that	  stadium	  for	  example	  bring	  to	  the	  franchises,	  other	  “un-­‐necessary”	  investments	  might	  not	  be	  prioritized.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  we	  were	  to	  consider	  a	  franchise	  owner	  that	  operates	  in	  a	  highly	  profitable	  area,	  the	  up	  front	  cost	  of	  a	  privately	  owned	  stadium	  might	  be	  worth	  the	  significant	  investment.	  Again	  referring	  to	  the	  econometrical	  study	  by	  Aleksander,	  the	  findings	  reveal	  that	  franchises	  that	  operate	  in	  new	  privately	  owned	  stadiums	  have,	  on	  average,	  higher	  franchise	  values.	  Explanations	  for	  this	  phenomenon	  include	  the	  new	  revenue	  sources	  from	  renting	  the	  venue	  and	  opportunity	  to	  sell	  the	  naming	  rights	  of	  the	  stadium	  to	  investors	  (p.59).	  In	  this	  case	  it	  again	  becomes	  a	  question	  of	  the	  market	  size	  and	  fan	  base.	  If	  a	  franchise	  operates	  in	  a	  large	  market	  with	  large	  fan	  base,	  the	  investment	  most	  likely	  will	  be	  worth	  significantly	  over	  the	  original	  price.	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  this	  scenario	  being	  true	  in	  small	  NHL	  markets.	  Going	  along	  with	  the	  stadium	  naming	  rights	  is	  also	  the	  identities	  of	  individual	  franchises	  in	  the	  NHL.	  This	  means	  that	  each	  franchise	  can	  choose	  to	  base	  their	  identity	  to	  city	  specific	  naming	  (Anaheim,	  Chicago,	  Detroit)	  or	  regional	  naming	  (Arizona,	  Colorado,	  Minnesota).	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  the	  impact	  that	  this	  has	  on	  the	  franchise	  values	  of	  these	  franchises.	  Looking	  at	  the	  table	  1.1,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  six	  franchises	  have	  chosen	  to	  base	  their	  franchise	  to	  regional	  identity	  (Carolina,	  Minnesota,	  Florida,	  Colorado,	  Arizona	  and	  New	  Jersey).	  All	  of	  these	  franchises	  operate	  significantly	  under	  the	  median	  franchise	  values	  in	  the	  league,	  and	  all	  of	  them	  exhibit	  growth	  that	  is	  slower	  than	  the	  median	  growth	  in	  the	  league.	  It	  can	  be	  assumed	  that	  the	  motivation	  behind	  regional	  identity	  opposed	  to	  city	  specific	  identity	  has	  to	  do	  with	  attracting	  a	  larger	  fan	  base	  and	  larger	  markets	  in	  general.	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  Besides	  the	  revenue	  sharing	  program	  and	  the	  utilization	  of	  the	  salary	  floor&cap	  system,	  the	  National	  Hockey	  League	  has	  adopted	  a	  reverse	  order	  drafting	  system.	  What	  it	  basically	  means	  is	  that	  the	  league	  gives	  the	  worst	  performing	  (in	  athletical	  terms)	  franchises	  the	  possibility	  to	  draft	  the	  most	  talented	  young	  players	  each	  year.	  The	  drafting	  order	  depends	  on	  the	  year-­‐end	  finishing	  position	  after	  the	  regular	  season	  has	  ended.	  In	  theory,	  this	  should	  allow	  poorly	  performing	  franchises	  to	  gradually	  strengthen	  their	  playing	  talent,	  and	  consequently	  improve	  their	  athletical	  competitive	  balance	  over	  time.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  this	  should	  also	  work	  from	  the	  opposite	  perspective,	  if	  a	  franchise	  is	  performing	  extremely	  well	  over	  many	  years,	  it	  should	  not	  be	  able	  to	  draft	  the	  potentially	  most	  talented	  players.	  Of	  course	  there	  are	  other	  significant	  factors	  also	  that	  contribute	  to	  how	  franchises	  are	  being	  built,	  but	  the	  reverse	  order	  draft	  is	  one	  important	  factor	  that	  supports	  the	  idea	  of	  competitive	  balance	  in	  the	  NHL.	  	  
4.1	  Punish	  success,	  reward	  failure	   	  
	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  distinguishing	  factor	  that	  makes	  sports	  business	  different	  from	  other	  branches	  of	  business,	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  leagues	  like	  the	  NHL	  punish	  the	  most	  athletically	  and	  financially	  successful	  franchises.	  Along	  with	  the	  revenue	  sharing	  program,	  the	  reverse	  order	  drafting	  system	  is	  a	  prime	  example	  of	  this.	  In	  addition	  to	  this,	  the	  league	  also	  rewards	  the	  least	  athletically	  successful	  franchises	  with	  the	  possibility	  to	  draft	  high-­‐end	  talents	  through	  the	  year-­‐end	  draft.	  The	  reasoning	  behind	  this	  is	  to	  promote	  the	  competitive	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balance	  in	  the	  league,	  and	  consequently	  avoid	  the	  creation	  of	  dynasties	  that	  would	  diminish	  the	  overall	  entertainment	  value,	  and	  possibly	  the	  overall	  fan	  base,	  of	  the	  league.	  The	  basic	  idea	  of	  the	  drafting	  system	  is	  that	  the	  percentage	  possibility	  to	  gain	  the	  overall	  first	  pick	  in	  the	  draft	  grows	  the	  lower	  the	  franchise	  finished	  in	  the	  previous	  season.	  According	  to	  NHL.com,	  “While	  the	  top	  pick	  can	  now	  go	  to	  any	  of	  the	  14	  non-­‐playoff	  clubs,	  or	  the	  team	  owning	  the	  rights	  to	  the	  first	  pick	  of	  a	  non-­‐playoff	  club,	  the	  odds	  of	  winning	  the	  lottery	  are	  unchanged	  from	  previous	  years.	  The	  teams	  in	  the	  drawing	  are	  ranked	  in	  inverse	  order	  of	  their	  regular	  season	  point	  totals,	  with	  team	  one	  being	  the	  club	  with	  the	  fewest	  points,	  and	  team	  14	  being	  the	  club	  with	  the	  most	  points	  among	  those	  outside	  of	  the	  playoffs.”	  (Accessed	  5/8/13)	  	  The	  percentage	  possibility	  of	  gaining	  the	  first	  overall	  pick	  is	  about	  30%	  less	  per	  lower	  position	  in	  the	  year-­‐end	  rankings.	  The	  importance	  of	  gaining	  the	  upcoming	  high-­‐class	  athletes	  can	  be	  seen	  both	  in	  the	  financial	  and	  athletical	  side	  of	  each	  franchise.	  	   Thinking	  this	  problem	  in	  more	  detail,	  it	  seems	  like	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  incentive	  for	  poorly	  performing	  franchises	  to	  finish	  at	  the	  very	  bottom	  of	  the	  standings	  in	  order	  to	  have	  the	  possibility	  to	  draft	  high-­‐end	  talents	  through	  the	  draft.	  If	  we	  were	  to	  consider	  the	  percentage	  possibilities	  discussed	  above,	  it	  seems	  almost	  self-­‐evident	  that	  franchises	  that	  are	  no	  longer	  in	  competition	  for	  high	  year-­‐end	  positions	  during	  the	  season,	  should	  consider	  losing	  in	  purpose	  a	  viable	  option.	  According	  to	  Fort,	  the	  reverse	  order	  rookie	  draft	  is	  justified	  on	  competitive	  balance	  grounds,	  because	  it	  enables	  weak	  drawing	  franchises	  to	  acquire	  outstanding	  new	  talent	  at	  bargain	  price	  (p.1274).	  This	  is	  understandable	  and	  justifiable	  when	  thinking	  at	  the	  possibilities	  of	  small-­‐market	  franchises	  to	  attract	  high-­‐end	  talent,	  but	  there	  still	  is	  a	  problem	  considering	  the	  entertainment	  value	  of	  the	  National	  Hockey	  League.	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The	  only	  significant	  problem	  for	  the	  owners’	  incentives	  to	  finish	  last	  is	  the	  different	  incentives	  by	  players.	  Player’s	  salary	  is	  determined	  not	  only	  by	  the	  entertainment	  value	  that	  the	  player	  brings,	  but	  also	  statistical	  performance.	  High-­‐class	  athletes	  are	  highly	  valued	  in	  the	  market	  pricing	  in	  professional	  sports.	  According	  to	  Vincent	  and	  Eastman,	  	  “A	  player’s	  offensive	  performance	  is	  easy	  to	  measure	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  most	  studies	  use	  either	  career	  points	  per	  game,	  or	  goals	  and	  assists	  per	  game.	  His	  defensive	  performance,	  however,	  is	  inherently	  more	  difficult	  to	  measure…	  usually	  using	  statistics	  such	  as	  a	  player’s	  career	  plus–minus	  record”	  (p.257).	  	  	  Entertainment	  of	  a	  hockey	  game,	  among	  with	  winning	  games,	  has	  to	  do	  with	  individual	  performances	  on	  ice.	  The	  use	  of	  individual	  player	  statistics	  is	  a	  significant	  source	  of	  determining	  players	  projected	  salary	  in	  the	  market.	  	  	   The	  player’s	  bargaining	  power	  over	  his	  salary	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  franchise	  that	  he	  plays	  in,	  but	  rather	  the	  individual	  performance	  of	  the	  player.	  According	  to	  Leeds,	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	  a	  player	  from	  having	  a	  good	  year	  is	  greater	  when	  the	  player	  is	  relatively	  underpaid	  than	  when	  he	  is	  relatively	  highly	  paid	  (p.246).	  This	  would	  suggest	  that	  players	  that	  have	  not	  bargained	  contracts	  according	  to	  their	  current	  level	  of	  play	  are	  highly	  motivated	  to	  improve	  the	  individual	  performance.	  On	  the	  larger	  picture,	  there	  might	  occur	  some	  incentive	  differences	  between	  poorly	  performing	  franchises	  and	  high-­‐performing	  athletes.	  Going	  back	  to	  the	  drafting	  system	  in	  the	  league,	  the	  athletical	  competitive	  balance	  comparison	  in	  table	  1.2	  shows	  that	  the	  reverse	  order	  draft	  does	  not	  guarantee	  periodical	  success	  even	  if	  there	  are	  theoretical	  basis	  for	  that.	  The	  time	  frame	  of	  ten	  years	  should	  be	  enough	  time	  to	  expect	  improved	  competitive	  balance	  with	  any	  franchise	  because	  of	  the	  player	  drafting	  system	  that	  rewards	  least	  successful	  teams.	  According	  to	  the	  NHL,	  Florida	  selected	  the	  first	  draft	  pick	  three	  times	  in	  the	  last	  fourteen	  years	  (accessed	  6/10/16),	  but	  it	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has	  finished	  worst	  than	  20th	  position	  on	  average	  in	  the	  last	  ten	  years.	  The	  similar	  phenomenon	  can	  be	  pointed	  out	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Edmonton,	  which	  has	  picked	  first	  three	  times	  and	  finished	  worst	  than	  25th	  on	  average	  in	  the	  last	  ten	  years.	  	  On	  the	  contrary,	  if	  we	  look	  at	  the	  best	  athletically	  performing	  franchises	  in	  table	  1.2,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  there	  are	  four	  franchises	  that	  have,	  on	  average,	  finished	  better	  than	  10th	  position	  in	  the	  last	  ten	  years.	  One	  explanation	  for	  this	  is	  that	  the	  franchises	  that	  have	  showed	  strong	  athletical	  competitive	  balance	  over	  the	  time	  frame	  also	  operate	  with	  stronger	  financial	  situation.	  All	  these	  four	  franchises	  (Anaheim,	  San	  Jose,	  Detroit	  and	  Pittsburgh)	  are	  close	  to	  or	  better	  than	  the	  average	  in	  financial	  valuation	  also.	  Next	  we	  will	  discuss	  in	  more	  detail	  why	  the	  reverse	  order	  draft	  does	  not	  automatically	  mean	  accumulation	  of	  talent	  and	  improved	  competitive	  balance.	  	  
4.2	  Entry-­‐level	  contracts	  
	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  significant	  problem	  with	  the	  reverse	  order	  draft	  and	  competitive	  balance	  comes	  from	  the	  financial	  situation	  of	  individual	  franchises.	  Even	  if	  a	  franchise	  is	  able	  to	  select	  first	  in	  the	  draft,	  the	  acquired	  player	  most	  likely	  becomes	  highly	  valued	  in	  the	  league	  rather	  quickly.	  The	  problem	  that	  arises	  again	  with	  the	  competitive	  balance	  is	  that	  these	  individual	  athletes	  usually	  tend	  to	  become	  too	  expensive	  for	  franchises	  that	  are	  balancing	  around	  the	  salary	  floor.	  Once	  these	  franchises	  sell	  their	  high-­‐class	  athletes	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  costs	  to	  minimum,	  they	  again	  most	  likely	  weaken	  their	  competitive	  balance.	  	  There	  are	  also	  studies	  about	  the	  success	  possibilities	  of	  draft	  picks,	  but	  as	  Rosen	  puts	  it,	  clear	  data	  are	  not	  available	  to	  calculate	  meaningful	  success	  possibilities	  for	  a	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potential	  entrant,	  but	  they	  are	  vanishingly	  small	  (p.19).	  It	  is	  rather	  guaranteed	  for	  a	  franchise	  to	  acquire	  high-­‐class	  talent	  if	  they	  are	  able	  to	  get	  the	  first	  draft	  picks,	  but	  after	  that	  it	  is	  a	  sum	  of	  many	  factors	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  draft	  pick	  will	  be	  of	  value	  for	  the	  franchise.	  Even	  if	  a	  certain	  player	  is	  drafted	  to	  the	  NHL,	  there	  is	  always	  so-­‐called	  “option	  value	  to	  entry”,	  meaning	  that	  each	  drafted	  player	  has	  the	  option	  to	  choose	  more	  financially	  valuable	  contracts	  outside	  of	  the	  NHL	  also.	  The	  NHL	  implemented	  a	  short-­‐term	  solution	  for	  the	  high-­‐end	  talent	  salary	  problem	  by	  using	  limitations	  in	  salaries	  of	  new	  players.	  This	  was	  done	  to	  ensure	  slightly	  more	  balanced	  distribution	  of	  playing	  talent	  in	  the	  league.	  According	  to	  the	  NHL,	  first-­‐year	  players	  are	  required	  to	  sign	  an	  entry-­‐level	  contract	  that	  limits	  the	  salary	  that	  the	  drafting	  franchise	  must	  pay	  for	  the	  player.	  Depending	  on	  the	  age	  of	  the	  player,	  the	  maximum	  contract	  length	  is	  three	  year	  for	  players	  under	  the	  age	  of	  21	  (accessed	  5/19/13).	  While	  this	  system	  definitely	  improves	  less	  valuable	  franchises’	  possibilities	  in	  obtaining	  high-­‐end	  talent,	  the	  solution	  is	  still	  rather	  short-­‐term.	  This	  primarily	  because	  not	  all	  first-­‐year	  players	  enter	  the	  NHL	  right	  away	  once	  signing	  the	  contract,	  and	  secondly	  because	  after	  the	  rookie	  contract	  expires,	  these	  players	  most	  likely	  will	  become	  too	  expensive	  to	  keep	  for	  financially	  weaker	  franchises.	  The	  fact	  that	  each	  franchise	  only	  has	  1-­‐3	  first-­‐round	  picks	  in	  the	  draft	  also	  limits	  the	  possibilities	  in	  obtaining	  many	  short-­‐term	  player	  investments	  to	  improve	  the	  franchises	  competitive	  balance	  (NHL.com	  accessed	  5/19/13).	  The	  number	  is	  determined	  by	  each	  franchises’	  General	  Manager’s	  actions	  during	  the	  year.	  	  
4.3	  Expansion	  draft	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Thinking	  about	  the	  competitive	  balance	  through	  the	  drafting	  system,	  it	  is	  quite	  straight	  forward	  how	  the	  reverse	  order	  draft	  increases	  the	  competitive	  balance	  of	  financially	  weaker	  franchises.	  However,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  consider	  the	  situation	  where	  there	  is	  a	  newly	  established	  franchise	  added	  to	  the	  league.	  According	  to	  the	  NHL,	  there	  is	  an	  expansion	  draft	  taking	  place	  every	  year	  when	  a	  new	  franchise	  is	  added	  to	  the	  league.	  The	  new	  franchise	  has	  an	  opportunity	  to	  draft	  players	  from	  other	  franchises,	  but	  with	  some	  restrictions.	  Every	  franchise	  that	  is	  required	  to	  allow	  the	  drafting	  of	  its	  players	  has	  the	  right	  to	  protect	  a	  total	  of	  nine	  players	  from	  the	  draft	  (accessed	  13/10/16).	  It	  can	  be	  assumed	  that	  these	  franchises	  protect	  the	  most	  skilled	  and	  valuable	  players	  from	  being	  drafted	  to	  the	  new	  franchise,	  leaving	  only	  “second	  best”	  options.	  	   In	  the	  case	  of	  the	  expansion	  draft,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  new	  franchises	  are	  not	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  athletically	  compete	  with	  other	  franchises	  immediately	  after	  being	  added	  to	  the	  league.	  	  According	  to	  Larsen	  “In	  an	  expansion	  draft,	  each	  team	  in	  the	  league	  must	  allow	  for	  the	  expansion	  team	  to	  draft	  certain	  players.	  However,	  the	  existing	  teams	  are	  able	  to	  protect	  most	  of	  their	  top	  talent	  and	  leave	  very	  little	  talent	  for	  the	  new	  teams,	  making	  it	  difficult	  for	  them	  to	  field	  teams	  that	  are	  up	  to	  par	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  league”	  (p.382)	  	  Even	  though	  the	  aggregate	  value	  of	  the	  league	  increases	  when	  league	  expansion	  takes	  place,	  there	  is	  a	  shock	  to	  the	  athletical	  competitive	  balance.	  Over	  long-­‐term	  projection,	  the	  added	  franchise	  will	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  trade	  with	  other	  franchises	  and	  cumulate	  playing	  talent	  through	  the	  reverse	  order	  draft.	  The	  competitive	  balance	  will	  most	  likely	  improve	  in	  the	  league	  regardless	  of	  the	  expansion,	  assuming	  that	  the	  ownership	  of	  the	  new	  franchise	  is	  willing	  to	  invest	  in	  playing	  talent,	  and	  consequently	  in	  increasing	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  franchise.	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5.	  Player	  demand	  
	  It	  was	  established	  earlier	  that	  sports	  leagues	  are	  unique	  among	  industries,	  in	  that	  competition	  between	  businesses	  (teams)	  in	  the	  industry	  (league)	  is	  the	  product	  being	  sold.	  Although	  monopoly	  prices	  and	  high	  subsidies	  for	  stadiums	  may	  harm	  consumers	  and	  taxpayers	  compared	  to	  competitive	  alternatives,	  federal	  courts	  have	  recognized	  the	  unique	  stand	  of	  sports	  (Kahn	  p.	  116).	  Even	  though	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  recognize	  that	  there	  is	  demand	  for	  labor	  in	  the	  sports	  league	  just	  as	  there	  are	  to	  any	  other	  form	  of	  industry.	  Franchises	  are	  competing	  for	  playing	  talent	  and	  labor	  services	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  their	  competitive	  balance	  compared	  to	  the	  other	  franchises.	  Operating	  in	  the	  realms	  of	  the	  salary	  floor	  and	  salary	  cap	  system,	  each	  franchise	  is	  motivated	  to	  find	  as	  competitive	  roster	  as	  possible	  with	  a	  given	  budget.	  	   What	  is	  special	  about	  the	  demand	  for	  labor	  in	  sports	  leagues,	  such	  as	  the	  NHL,	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  marginal	  revenue	  that	  each	  individual	  player	  brings	  to	  the	  franchise	  is	  almost	  impossible	  to	  calculate.	  According	  to	  Rosen	  “the	  marginal	  revenue	  product	  of	  a	  particular	  player	  is	  the	  extra	  price	  that	  a	  spectator	  is	  willing	  to	  pay	  times	  the	  number	  of	  people	  who	  are	  attracted.	  Not	  only	  based	  on	  certain	  statistical	  fact	  such	  as	  goals	  etc…”	  (p.7).	  To	  put	  this	  into	  other	  words,	  a	  single	  player	  brings	  statistical	  value	  to	  the	  franchise	  in	  terms	  of	  points	  per	  game,	  but	  that	  hardly	  is	  the	  cumulative	  value.	  The	  business	  of	  hockey	  is	  also	  entertainment,	  and	  each	  individual	  player	  brings	  some	  entertainment	  value	  for	  the	  franchise	  also.	  We	  will	  discuss	  a	  little	  later	  about	  the	  salary	  formation	  per	  player	  and	  how	  individual	  franchises	  are	  built	  in	  terms	  of	  playing	  talent.	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5.1	  Free	  Agency	  	  According	  to	  the	  NHL,	  the	  term	  free	  agency	  basically	  means	  that	  a	  player	  is	  free	  to	  sign	  with	  any	  other	  franchise	  without	  compensation	  to	  the	  current	  franchise	  (accessed	  6/10/16).	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  many	  drawbacks	  that	  this	  could	  have	  on	  the	  competitive	  balance	  in	  the	  league,	  and	  how	  the	  free	  agency	  can	  be	  disadvantageous	  for	  owners	  in	  economical	  terms.	  If	  we	  consider	  the	  drafting	  system	  discussed	  above,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  even	  though	  a	  certain	  small	  market	  franchise	  is	  able	  to	  draft	  extremely	  high-­‐class	  talent	  it	  might	  have	  difficulties	  in	  committing	  the	  player	  to	  long	  term	  contract.	  This	  is	  because	  it	  is	  in	  the	  power	  of	  the	  player	  to	  decide	  the	  desired	  contract	  after	  the	  entry-­‐level	  contract	  expires.	  In	  this	  case	  the	  market	  pressure	  is	  on	  the	  players’	  side	  when	  considering	  franchises	  that	  are	  obtaining	  high-­‐class	  players.	  	   The	  allocation	  of	  players	  around	  the	  league	  is,	  to	  some	  extend,	  controlled	  by	  the	  salary	  cap	  and	  salary	  floor	  systems.	  However,	  the	  free	  agency	  forces	  small	  market	  franchises	  to	  react	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  might	  not	  be	  the	  ultimately	  desired	  locations	  for	  players.	  This	  means	  that	  even	  though	  small	  market	  franchise	  is	  able	  to	  hold	  on	  to	  high-­‐class	  talent	  for	  some	  time	  because	  of	  the	  entry-­‐level	  contracts,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  be	  absolutely	  certain	  that	  these	  players	  will	  not	  reach	  free	  agency.	  This	  would	  mean	  that	  the	  franchise	  would	  not	  profit	  for	  the	  player	  if	  the	  player	  chooses	  to	  relocate	  after	  the	  entry-­‐level	  contract	  expires.	  It	  becomes	  a	  question	  of	  maximizing	  team	  rents	  for	  the	  franchises	  and	  surpluses	  for	  the	  players.	  According	  to	  Rosen	  “the	  allocation	  of	  players	  among	  teams	  should	  maximize	  total	  team	  rents	  plus	  consumer	  surplus	  of	  players”	  (p.14).	  After	  all,	  both	  the	  franchises	  and	  the	  players	  are	  motivated	  to	  maximize	  their	  revenues.	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Looking	  at	  the	  drafting	  system	  and	  free	  agency	  in	  a	  broader	  perspective,	  we	  can	  state	  that	  it	  is	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  players,	  as	  well	  as	  franchises,	  to	  bargain	  a	  contract	  that	  maximizes	  utility	  for	  both.	  After	  all,	  the	  basic	  assumptions	  underlying	  the	  economical	  review	  of	  sports	  leagues’	  are	  1)	  the	  profit	  maximization	  behavior	  by	  teams	  2)	  the	  income	  maximizing	  behavior	  by	  players	  and	  3)	  market	  equilibrium	  outcomes	  (Fort	  p.	  1266).	  Even	  though	  the	  market	  is	  somewhat	  controlled	  in	  the	  business	  of	  sports,	  we	  can	  assume	  that	  franchises	  and	  players	  make	  economical	  decisions	  according	  to	  their	  expectations	  of	  revenue	  maximizing	  outcomes.	  	  	  
5.1.1	  Monopsony	  power	  	  The	  introduction	  of	  free	  agency	  has	  had	  a	  drastic	  influence	  on	  the	  monopsony	  power	  of	  individual	  franchises.	  This	  means	  that	  once	  the	  individual	  players’	  rights	  are	  no	  longer	  exclusively	  owned	  by	  certain	  franchises,	  the	  bargaining	  power	  of	  players	  have	  escalated	  by	  a	  great	  margin.	  Now	  players	  have	  the	  option	  to	  test	  their	  value	  in	  the	  free	  market	  when	  only	  few	  buyers	  cannot	  push	  market	  prices	  down.	  Prior	  to	  the	  advent	  of	  free	  agency,	  the	  monopsonistic	  teams	  were	  only	  constrained	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  were	  forced	  to	  offer	  player	  a	  salary	  greater	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  the	  player’s	  salary	  in	  the	  next-­‐best	  occupation	  (Leeds	  p.246).	  Even	  though	  the	  free	  agency	  has	  had	  some	  negative	  consequences	  on	  the	  weak-­‐drawing	  franchises	  bargaining	  power,	  it	  has	  increased	  the	  equality	  between	  franchises	  and	  athletes.	  However,	  this	  has	  had	  some	  drawbacks	  on	  the	  training	  incentives	  of	  franchise	  owners,	  as	  they	  cannot	  be	  certain	  that	  players	  stay	  in	  the	  team	  for	  extended	  periods	  (Rosen	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p.20).	  This	  leads	  to	  the	  situation	  where	  it	  is	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  the	  franchise	  owners	  to	  get	  the	  maximum	  output	  from	  the	  current	  players	  and	  then	  negotiate	  contracts	  that	  maximize	  franchises’	  profits.	  For	  the	  financially	  strong	  franchises	  this	  does	  not	  create	  significant	  burdens,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  the	  case	  for	  financially	  weak	  franchises.	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  expect	  superstar	  athletes	  staying	  with	  financially	  weak	  franchises	  considering	  the	  revenue	  maximizing	  incentive	  for	  both	  the	  franchise	  and	  the	  athlete.	  	  
5.2	  Team	  building	  	  There	  are	  many	  restrictions	  to	  acquiring	  playing	  talent	  in	  the	  NHL,	  such	  as	  the	  salary	  cap	  and	  floor	  format,	  but	  eventually	  it	  has	  much	  to	  do	  with	  the	  financial	  situation	  of	  each	  franchise.	  According	  to	  the	  Forbes	  valuations,	  in	  2015	  the	  highest	  paid	  players	  earn	  over	  14	  million	  dollars	  for	  a	  single	  season	  (accessed	  6/10/16).	  If	  we	  consider	  the	  maximum	  roster	  size	  (23	  players)	  and	  the	  salary	  spending	  restrictions,	  it	  becomes	  evident	  that	  only	  financially	  strong	  franchises	  are	  on	  the	  market	  for	  superstar	  athletes.	  The	  competitive	  balance	  can	  hardly	  be	  seen	  as	  being	  entirely	  dependent	  on	  the	  salary	  spending,	  but	  it	  is	  impossible	  leave	  it	  unnoticed	  considering	  these	  facts.	  If	  a	  franchise	  is	  operating	  near	  the	  salary	  floor,	  it	  is	  almost	  impossible	  to	  even	  consider	  acquiring	  individual	  players	  that	  would	  take	  approximately	  1/4	  of	  the	  overall	  salary	  spending.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  franchises	  that	  operate	  at	  the	  salary	  ceiling	  the	  same	  proportion	  drops	  to	  1/7	  of	  the	  overall	  salary	  spending.	  Each	  franchise	  had	  its	  own	  motivations	  and	  budgets	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  acquiring	  players,	  but	  there	  are	  some	  general	  assumptions	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  building	  a	  sports	  team.	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First	  of	  all,	  players	  can	  be	  counted	  as	  being	  complementary	  goods	  in	  terms	  of	  replaceability.	  If	  a	  quality	  of	  team	  members	  go	  down,	  the	  demand	  (price)	  of	  complementary	  players	  go	  up.	  Basically	  meaning	  that	  selling	  franchises	  and	  individual	  players	  hold	  the	  bargaining	  power	  in	  terms	  of	  compensation	  when	  the	  demand	  for	  their	  services	  is	  high.	  Another	  factor	  that	  franchises	  need	  to	  take	  into	  consideration	  when	  building	  a	  team	  is	  that,	  on	  top	  of	  selling	  competition,	  they	  are	  also	  selling	  entertainment.	  Spectators	  pay	  exclusive	  prices	  for	  attending	  the	  games,	  and	  the	  true	  entertainment	  factor	  comes	  from	  players	  that	  hold	  so	  called	  superstar	  status.	  	  
5.2.1	  Superstar	  externalities	  	   It	  has	  been	  established	  earlier	  that	  athletical	  success	  does	  attract	  consumers	  (spectators)	  and	  increases	  franchises	  fan	  base.	  However,	  according	  to	  Sherwin	  Rosen	  “an	  increase	  in	  the	  number	  of	  consumers,	  or	  in	  the	  intensity	  of	  their	  demands	  for	  y,	  increases	  the	  market	  demand	  for	  services	  (p.855).	  To	  put	  this	  into	  context,	  the	  “y”	  in	  this	  statement	  refers	  to	  superstar	  status	  athletes,	  whose	  services	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  broaden	  the	  interest	  towards	  the	  franchise.	  This	  is	  an	  important	  factor	  for	  any	  franchise	  considering	  their	  motivations	  and	  objectives	  on	  how	  to	  build	  the	  franchise.	  This	  is	  one	  explanation	  for	  the	  salary	  differences	  in	  the	  NHL,	  and	  how	  the	  differences	  within	  team	  members	  can	  be	  justified.	  In	  terms	  of	  league-­‐wide	  influences	  that	  superstar-­‐status	  athletes	  bring,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  consider	  the	  externalities	  that	  these	  athletes	  bring	  to	  the	  league.	  On	  top	  of	  the	  benefits	  that	  these	  athletes	  bring	  to	  the	  owning	  franchise,	  superstars	  attract	  fan	  interest	  all	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over	  the	  league.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  positive	  to	  the	  league	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  not	  only	  the	  owning	  franchise.	  It	  is	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  the	  league	  as	  a	  whole	  to	  produce	  these	  athletes,	  and	  promote	  their	  status.	  This	  is	  because	  of	  there	  is	  no	  better	  way	  to	  broaden	  the	  market	  for	  hockey	  entertainment	  than	  to	  use	  the	  positive	  externalities	  that	  these	  athletes	  bring	  in	  terms	  of	  aggregate	  fan	  base.	  	  
Conclusion	  	  There	  are	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  financial	  situations	  between	  franchises	  in	  the	  National	  Hockey	  League.	  Some	  of	  these	  differences	  are	  naturally	  occurring,	  such	  as	  the	  market	  size	  and	  location	  of	  each	  franchise,	  but	  there	  are	  also	  incentives	  to	  operate	  smaller	  value	  franchises	  for	  the	  owners.	  The	  National	  Hockey	  League	  has	  addressed	  these	  financial	  differences	  by	  implementing	  a	  revenue	  sharing	  program	  that	  requires	  stronger	  franchises	  to	  share	  part	  of	  their	  revenue	  with	  the	  financially	  weaker	  franchises.	  Considering	  the	  continuous	  expansion	  of	  the	  NHL	  to	  new	  economic	  areas,	  this	  is	  perhaps	  the	  only	  effective	  way	  of	  maintaining	  even	  remotely	  financially	  competitive	  league.	  However,	  there	  are	  two	  major	  drawbacks	  to	  this	  system;	  one	  being	  the	  incentive	  for	  some	  weaker	  franchises	  to	  operate	  small	  budget	  teams	  in	  order	  to	  generate	  revenue	  through	  the	  revenue	  sharing	  program.	  The	  other	  drawback	  has	  to	  do	  with	  hindering	  the	  economic	  growth	  of	  the	  successful	  franchises	  by	  forcing	  them	  to	  share	  their	  growth	  with	  other	  franchises.	  	   When	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  athletical	  competitive	  balance,	  the	  National	  Hockey	  League	  has	  adopted	  a	  reverse	  order	  draft	  and	  free	  agency	  programs.	  For	  the	  financially	  weaker	  franchises,	  the	  reverse	  order	  draft	  is	  the	  most	  important	  channel	  for	  acquiring	  high-­‐end	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talent.	  This	  is	  because	  so-­‐called	  “superstar”	  athletes	  are	  too	  expensive	  for	  franchises	  that	  are	  operating	  at	  the	  salary	  floor.	  For	  the	  individual	  athletes,	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  free	  agency	  has	  created	  a	  way	  of	  maximizing	  their	  revenue	  over	  the	  career.	  Prior	  to	  the	  free	  agency	  era,	  the	  monopsony	  power	  was	  completely	  held	  by	  the	  franchises.	  In	  the	  modern	  league,	  the	  market	  bargaining	  power	  has	  shifted	  from	  the	  franchises	  to	  the	  individual	  players	  that	  are	  performing	  well.	  	  	   In	  terms	  of	  franchise	  location,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  consider	  the	  continuous	  expansion	  of	  the	  NHL	  to	  economically	  new	  areas.	  As	  we	  have	  established	  throughout	  the	  paper,	  the	  league	  is	  motivated	  to	  expand	  on	  a	  regular	  basis.	  However,	  it	  becomes	  a	  question	  of	  new	  franchise	  owners’	  willingness	  to	  invest	  in	  creating	  an	  athletically	  competitive	  team.	  It	  is	  also	  interesting	  to	  notice	  the	  distinguishing	  difference	  between	  franchises	  located	  in	  Canada	  and	  in	  franchises	  located	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  It	  becomes	  evident	  that	  the	  Canadian	  franchises	  are	  extremely	  strong	  when	  the	  financial	  side	  is	  considered,	  but	  the	  athletical	  competitive	  balance	  remains	  highly	  unpredictable.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  predict	  the	  financial	  outlook	  of	  a	  newly	  established	  franchise	  through	  its	  market	  size	  and	  location,	  but	  the	  athletical	  performance	  almost	  impossible	  to	  predict.	  	   Even	  though	  most	  literature	  focuses	  on	  the	  financial	  aspect	  of	  National	  Hockey	  League	  franchises	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  competitive	  balance,	  I	  would	  consider	  the	  simultaneous	  study	  between	  athletical	  and	  financial	  perspectives	  more	  efficient.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  financial	  side	  of	  the	  league	  will	  never	  be	  competitive,	  but	  the	  athletical	  side	  has	  the	  possibility	  to	  reach	  better	  competitive	  balance	  situation.	  After	  all,	  the	  National	  Hockey	  League	  and	  the	  individual	  franchises	  are	  in	  the	  business	  of	  selling	  competition.	  The	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entertainment	  value	  of	  the	  league	  is	  vital	  for	  the	  financial	  success	  of	  the	  league,	  and	  the	  individual	  franchises.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  




	  All	  figures	  are	  expressed	  in	  millions	  of	  dollars2	  Franchise	  values	  bolded	  refer	  to	  low-­‐growth	  franchises	  Franchise	  values	  bolded	  and	  underlined	  refer	  to	  high-­‐growth	  franchises	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Figures	  extracted	  from	  the	  Forbes	  website	  “The	  Business	  of	  Hockey”	  
Team	   Value	  2011	   Value	  2012	   Value	  2013	   Value	  2014	   Value	  2015	  
%	  Change	  
(2011-­‐2015)	  
       Vancouver	   300	   342	   700	   800	   745	   148	  NY	  Rangers	   507	   750	   850	   1100	   1200	   137	  Pittsburgh	   264	   288	   480	   565	   560	   112	  St	  Louis	   157	   130	   185	   235	   270	   72	  Boston	  	   325	   348	   600	   750	   750	   131	  Nashville	  	   163	   167	   205	   250	   255	   56	  New	  Jersey	   181	   205	   320	   330	   330	   82	  Detroit	   336	   346	   470	   570	   600	   79	  Philadelphia	   290	   336	   500	   625	   660	   128	  
Chicago	   306	   350	   625	   825	   925	   202	  San	  Jose	   211	   223	   405	   425	   445	   111	  Phoenix	   134	   134	   200	   225	   220	   64	  
Washington	   225	   250	   414	   500	   565	   151	  Dallas	   230	   240	   333	   420	   450	   96	  Ottawa	   201	   220	   380	   400	   370	   84	  Colorado	   198	   210	   337	   360	   360	   82	  
Los	  Angeles	   232	   276	   450	   580	   580	   150	  Buffalo	   173	   175	   250	   288	   300	   73	  
Florida	   162	   170	   240	   190	   186	   15	  
Tampa	  Bay	   174	   174	   180	   230	   260	   49	  Calgary	   220	   245	   420	   451	   435	   98	  Winnipeg*	   164	   200	   340	   358	   350	   113	  Minnesota	   213	   218	   330	   370	   380	   78	  Toronto	   521	   1000	   1150	   1300	   1150	   121	  Anaheim	   184	   192	   300	   365	   400	   117	  NY	  Islanders	   149	   155	   195	   300	   325	   118	  
Carolina	  	   169	   162	   187	   220	   225	   33	  Edmonton	   212	   225	   400	   475	   450	   112	  
Montreal	   445	   575	   775	   1000	   1175	   164	  
Columbus	   152	   145	   175	   200	   226	   49	  
    Mean	   504.9	   100.8	  
    Median	   417.5	   104.5	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Table	  1.2	  	  
Team	   2015	   2014	   2013	   2012	   2011	   2010	   2009	   2008	   2007	   2006	   Mean	  
            Vancouver	   28	   8	   25	   1	   1	   5	   8	   21	   7	   16	   12	  NY	  Rangers	   9	   1	   12	   2	   14	   20	   12	   13	   16	   10	   10.9	  
Pittsburgh	   4	   15	   6	   3	   2	   7	   9	   5	   11	   29	   9.1	  St	  Louis	   3	   4	   4	   4	   21	   15	   16	   28	   23	   30	   14.8	  Boston	  	   16	   17	   1	   5	   9	   17	   2	   16	   22	   26	   13.1	  Nashville	  	   14	   6	   19	   6	   11	   8	   20	   17	   2	   6	   10.9	  New	  Jersey	   20	   25	   20	   7	   22	   6	   4	   6	   6	   8	   12.4	  
Detroit	   15	   12	   15	   8	   6	   11	   3	   1	   4	   1	   7.6	  Philadelphia	   13	   24	   13	   9	   5	   14	   11	   14	   30	   9	   14.2	  Chicago	   5	   7	   7	   10	   12	   2	   6	   19	   26	   28	   12.2	  
San	  Jose	   11	   22	   5	   11	   4	   3	   1	   2	   3	   11	   7.3	  Phoenix	   24	   29	   18	   12	   15	   4	   24	   23	   27	   22	   19.8	  Washington	   1	   9	   17	   13	   3	   1	   5	   11	   28	   27	   11.5	  Dallas	   2	   19	   16	   14	   17	   22	   22	   7	   5	   2	   12.6	  Ottawa	   19	   13	   21	   15	   26	   12	   23	   10	   9	   3	   15.1	  Colorado	   21	   21	   3	   16	   29	   13	   28	   9	   12	   13	   16.5	  Los	  Angeles	   8	   18	   10	   17	   10	   9	   27	   29	   29	   17	   17.4	  Buffalo	   23	   30	   30	   18	   16	   10	   18	   20	   1	   5	   17.1	  
Florida	   7	   20	   29	   19	   28	   28	   14	   22	   21	   23	   21.1	  Tampa	  Bay	   12	   5	   8	   20	   8	   25	   30	   30	   13	   14	   16.5	  Calgary	   26	   16	   27	   21	   18	   16	   7	   15	   15	   7	   16.8	  
Winnipeg	   25	   14	   22	   22	   25	   23	   25	   27	   14	   20	   21.7	  Minnesota	   17	   11	   11	   23	   20	   21	   19	   8	   10	   21	   16.1	  
Toronto	   30	   27	   23	   24	   23	   29	   26	   24	   19	   19	   24.4	  
Anaheim	   6	   3	   2	   25	   7	   18	   13	   4	   8	   12	   9.8	  
NY	  
Islanders	   10	   10	   26	   26	   27	   26	   29	   25	   18	   24	   22.1	  Carolina	  	   18	   26	   24	   27	   19	   24	   10	   12	   20	   4	   18.4	  
Edmonton	   29	   28	   28	   28	   30	   30	   21	   18	   25	   18	   25.5	  Montreal	   22	   2	   9	   29	   13	   19	   15	   3	   17	   15	   14.4	  
Columbus	   27	   23	   14	   30	   24	   27	   17	   26	   24	   25	   23.7	  
          Mean	   15.5	  	  Yearly	  number	  refers	  to	  league	  finishing	  position	  that	  current	  year3	  Franchise	  values	  bolded	  refer	  to	  high-­‐performing	  franchises	  Franchise	  values	  bolded	  and	  underlined	  refer	  to	  low-­‐performing	  franchises	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Figures	  extracted	  from	  the	  “Official	  National	  Hockey	  League	  website”	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Table	  1.3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Table	  1.4	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  Table	  (1.3)	  refers	  to	  Stanley	  Cup	  winners4	  Table	  (1.4)	  refers	  to	  average	  attendance	  figures	  in	  each	  franchise’s	  home	  games	  in	  20135	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Information	  extracted	  from	  the	  “Official	  National	  Hockey	  League	  website”	  5	  Figures	  extracted	  from	  https://hockeyattendance.com	  
Team	   Attendance	  
%-­‐
capacity	  
   Chicago	   21640	   109.8	  Montreal	   21273	   100	  Detroit	   20066	   100	  Philadelphia	   19845	   101.6	  Toronto	   19447	   103.4	  Calgary	   19302	   100.1	  Vancouver	   18910	   100	  Tampa	  Bay	   18626	   97	  Pittsburgh	   18619	   101.3	  Buffalo	   18576	   97.4	  Minnesota	   18523	   102.5	  Washington	   18506	   100	  Los	  Angeles	   18147	   100.2	  Ottawa	   18109	   94.5	  NY	  Rangers	   18006	   104.7	  St	  Louis	   17593	   91.9	  Boston	  	   17565	   100	  San	  Jose	   17562	   100	  Edmonton	   16839	   100	  Nashville	  	   16600	   97	  Anaheim	   16511	   96.1	  Colorado	   16386	   91	  Dallas	   15590	   84.1	  Carolina	  	   15484	   82.9	  New	  Jersey	   15012	   85.2	  Winnipeg	   15004	   100	  Columbus	   14901	   82.1	  Florida	   14525	   75.5	  NY	  Islanders	   13858	   85.7	  Phoenix	   13776	   80.4	  
   
Mean	   17493	   95.48	  
Median	   17800	   100	  
Year	   Winner	  
  1986	   Montreal	  1987	   Edmonton	  1988	   Edmonton	  1989	   Calgary	  1990	   Edmonton	  1991	   Pittsburgh	  1992	   Pittsburgh	  1993	   Montreal	  1994	   NY	  Rangers	  1995	   New	  Jersey	  1996	   Colorado	  1997	   Detroit	  1998	   Detroit	  1999	   Dallas	  2000	   New	  Jersey	  2001	   Colorado	  2002	   Detroit	  2003	   New	  Jersey	  2004	   Tampa	  Bay	  2005	   (Lockout)	  2006	   Carolina	  2007	   Anaheim	  2008	   Detroit	  2009	   Pittsburgh	  2010	   Chicago	  2011	   Boston	  2012	   Los	  Angeles	  2013	   Chicago	  2014	   Los	  Angeles	  2015	   Chicago	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